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Summary
In the past decade, we have seen a resurgence of patent pools. These pools have
emerged in our high-tech world to overcome a number of transaction costs involved
in assembling patents necessary for the creation of new technologies. While patent
pools can be pro-competitive; they can also present a number of anti-competitive
features, such as sheltering collusion and eliminating competition between rival
firms. This has been said to explain the enormous swings in the analytical approach
of enforcement agencies with respect to patent pools.
The introduction of the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing ofIntellectual Property by
American competition authorities marked an important shift in patent pool
enforcement, reflecting the view that intellectual property and competition law are
actually complementary, both seeking to enhance innovation as well as competition.
Based on these Guidelines, enforcement agencies' identified potential problems and
have offered a number of guiding principles and recommendations - in the form of
Business Review Letters - to help pooling parties avoid running afoul of competition
law.
A review of some of these guidelines reveals that following them indiscriminately,
without regard to the particular circumstances, can in fact have a negative impact on
innovation and industry. Four areas where a clarification and refinement of policy
are necessary are highlighted; namely, the essentiality doctrine, pool, independent
licensing and grantback clauses. We maintain that guidance from the competition
authorities is too rigid, and that a more carefully tailored approach is necessary to
achieve an optimal outcome in both competition and innovation.
KEY WORDS: Patent pools, antitrust, enforcement, essential patents, Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing ofIntellectual Property
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Resume
Au cours de Ia derniere decennie, nous observons une renaissance de l'institution
des communautes de brevets (patent pools), constitues pour surmonter Ies couts
afferents a Ia reunion des brevets necessaires pour Ia creation des nouvelles
technologies. Bien que ces communautes de brevets en general favorisent Ia
concurrence, elles peuvent aussi avoir des effets anti-concurrentieIs, entre autre, en
permettant Ia collusion et I'elimination de Ia concurrence entre compagnies rivales.
On a dit que ceci explique Ies etonnantes oscillations dans 11 approche analytique
qu'ont adoptee Ies organismes d'application a l'egard des communautes de brevets.
L'introduction des Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing ofIntellectual Property par Ies
autorites de Ia concurrence americaines marque un point tournant dans I'analyse des
communautes de brevets, refletant Ie fait que Ies lois de Ia propriete intellectuelle et
celles de Ia concurrence sont, en realite, complementaires en ce qu'elles tendent
toutes Ies deux a ameliorer I'innovation et Ia concurrence. Se basant sur ces lignes
directrices, Ies agences ont identifie Ies problemes potentieis et ont offert un certain
nombre de directives et de recommandations sous forme de Iettres de revue
(Business Review Letters) pour aider ceux qui entendent constituer des communautes
de brevets a eviter d'enfreindre Ia Ioi.
Toutefois, une revision de certaines de ces lignes directrices demontre que, suivies
d'une fa<;:on inconsiderees, sans egard aux circonstances particulieres, elles peuvent
avoir un impact negatif sur I'innovation et I'industrie. Quatre sections ont ete mises
en evidence OU Ies regles doivent etre clarifiees et nuancees, a savoir Ia doctrine de
I'essentialite, Ies droits d'exclusivite, Ies services independants delivrant Ies licences
et Ies clauses de retrocession. Nous soutenons que Ies regles adoptees par Ies
autorites de Ia concurrence sont trop rigides et qu'une approche plus nuancee est
necessaire pour atteindre un resultat optimal, ala fois pour Ia concurrence et pour
I'innovation.
MOTES CLES: communautes de brevets, antitrust, brevets essentiels, Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing ofIntellectual Property
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I. Introduction
We are living in an era of unprecedented technological innovation and
growth. This is reflected in the skyrocketing number of patent awards over
the past several decades. Advances in such fields as software,
semiconductors, and biotechnology are spurring this explosion in the
number of patents. In 2005 alone, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
granted 170,000 patents, an increase from the 140,574 awarded in 1998.1
A number of commentators have suggested the proliferation of patents is
having a socially detrimental impact as it becomes increasingly difficult to
amalgamate the tens, if not hundreds, of patents necessary to commercialize
advanced technologies.2 Patent pools have recently emerged as an
increasingly popular response to the diffusion of intellectual property
rights,3 although they had been proposed by competition scholars for over
four decades.4 In truth, the patent pool has been in use throughout the last
century in a wide range of industries. As one author in the early part of the
20th century noted, "[t]he pool is probably the oldest, the most common and
1 See Deborah ASBRAND, «Everyone Into the Patent Pool», Business Innovation, Ganuary IS,
2007), online: <http://www.businessinnovation.cmp.com/artic1es/straC070116.jhtrnl>.
2 Nancy Gallini reviews this literature. See generally, Nancy T. GALLIN!, «The Economics of
Patents: Lessons from Recent U.s. Patent Reform», (2002) 16 Journal ofEconomic Perspectives,
131.
3 See Alexander J. HADJIS, «Patent Pools Gain Popularity But They May Be Subject to an
Antitrust-Based Patent Misuse Defense», 27 National Law Journal Sl (December 16, 2004).
4 See e.g., George PRIEST, «Cartels and Patent License Agreements», (1977) 20 J.L. & Econ.
309; Robert P. MERGES, <<Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of
Patent Pools», (1999) Berkeley Center for Law and Technology, online: <https:/ /www.law.
berkeley.edu/institutes/bc1t/pubs/merges/pools.pdf>; Carl SHAPIRO, «Navigating the
Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting», in Adam B. JAFFE, Josh
LERNER and Scott STERN (eds.), Innovation Policy and the Economy, Vol. I, Cambridge, MIT
Press, 2001, p. 119; Jeanne CLARK, Joe PICCOLO, Brian STANTON and Karin TYSON,
«Patent Pools: A Solution to the Problem of Access in Biotechnology Patent?» United States
Patent and Trademark Office, (December 5,2000), online: <http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/pac/dapp/ opla/patentpool.pdf>.
2at the same time the most popular, mode of obviating the evils of
. . "5competition...
However, by the 1940s, patent pools had been formed in the agricultural
machinery, chemicals, communications, electrical-equipment, glass, mining,
munitions, oil, paper, radio, railroad equipment, rubber and steel industries.
Lerner, Strojwas and Tirole identified about 125 patent pools, dating from
between 1856 and 2001.6 Patent pools continue to be employed in a number
of industries. As recently as March 2007, Thomson a digital video
technologies company, joined the Association of Radio Industries and
Businesses (ARIB) patent pool established by a consortium of Japanese
broadcasters and electronics companies.?
Patent pools have received few scholarly treatments, despite the fact that
products based in whole or in part on patent pools generate at least $100
billion US per year in sales.8 In several of the studies that have been
conducted, patent pools received favourable consideration,9 while in others,
5 William Z. RIPLEY, <<Introduction», in William Z. RIPLEY (ed.), Trusts, Pools and
Corporations, (revised ed.), Boston, Ginn & Company, 1916, p. xiii
6 See Josh LERNER, Marcin STROJWAS and Jean TIROLE, «The Design of Patent Pools: The
Determinants of Licensing Rules», IDEI Working Papers 187, (November 4,2005) Institut
d'Economie Industrielle, online: <http://ideLfr/doc/wp/2005/design_patenLpools.pdf>, p.
11 [forthcoming in the Rand Journal ofEconomics].
7 See THOMSON, Press Release, «Thomson Joins Patent Pool For Japanese Digital
Broadcasting Standard», (March 7,2007), online: <http://www.thomson.net/EN/Home/
Press/Press+Details.htrn?PressReleaseID=ab8ff7ec-cell-4167-be62-4f41340d85bb>.
8 See Gavin CLARKSON, Objective Identification ofPatent Thickets: A Network Analytic
Approach, (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard Business School, 2004) [unpublished], p. 7. A number of
economists have recently written on patent pools. Both Choi and Shapiro have examined
patent pools in the context of patent litigation settlements constrained by antitrust law. See
Jay Pil CHOI, «Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation», CESifo
Working Paper No. 1070, (November 2003), online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=466062>.
See also, Carl SHAPIRO, «Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements», (2003) 34 Rand Journal of
Economics 29I.
9 See e.g., Robert P. MERGES, «Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights
and Collective Rights Organizations», (1996) 84 Calif L. Rev. 1293,1295-1296; Joshua A.
NEWBERG, «Antitrust, Patent Pools, and the Management of Uncertainty» (2000) 3 Atlantic
L.J.I.
3the authors raised concerns about their potential anticompetitive effects.10
Nevertheless, enforcement agencies, such as the Department of Justice
(DO]) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have come to accept that
patent pools may be socially beneficial. Thus, it is somewhat surprising that
despite the renewed interest in patent pools, they remain relatively rare.ll
Our concern here addresses the competition law enforcement of patent
pools. Specifically, our contention is that we must rethink the approach
enforcement agencies take towards patent pools. In the words of Skitol and
Wu,
" .... today's rules warrant fresh thinking: they are too rigid in some respects
and inadequately protective in other respects. In short, sound and effective
antitrust policy toward patent pools should be considered a work in
progress; one size does not fit all pools in all market contexts or at all stages
of their development, and there is a need for more sensitivity to variability in
their competitive effects."12
1.1. Definition, Form and Structure of Patent Pools
It is important that we define what a patent pool is before we begin any
examination of its treatment by competition authorities. Simply put, a
patent pool is an arrangement among multiple patent holders to combine
their patents. The pool metaphor was adopted from the oil industry, where
a number of different individuals might have an interest in a pool of oil
10 See e.g., G. PRIEST, loco cit., note 4; David S. TAYLOR, «The Sinking of the United States
Electronics Industry Within Japanese Patent Pools», (1992) 26 Ceo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ.
181; Steven C. CARLSON, «Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma», (1999) 16 Yale J. on
Reg. 359.
11 See Patrick GAULE, «Towards Patent Pools in Biotechnology?», (2006) 2 Innovation
Strategy Today, 123, 124, online: <http://www.biodevelopments.org/innovation/ist5.pdf>.
12 Robert SKITOL and Lawrence WU, «A Transatlantic Swim Through Patent Pools: Keeping
Antitrust Sharks at Bay», in Paul LUGARD and Leigh HANCHER (eds.), On the Merits:
Current Issues in Competition Law and Policy, (liber amicorum Peter Plompen), Antwerp,
Intersentia, 2005, p.l03, at page 103.
4lying under their respective properties.13 Each individual has the incentive
to drill too many wells and pump them too fast, leaving everyone worse off.
However, the parties can increase efficiency and profit by reaching an
agreement on sharing expenses and revenues in accordance with some
formula.
The term "pool" has been used to describe a number of different
arrangements by which patent owners combine their patents. Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court pointed out in 1948 that the expression 'patent
pool' did not constitute a term of art.14 Used in its broadest sense, the term
'patent pool' has been used to express the idea of aggregating the use of
patents held by more than one patent owner.l5 Put differently, pools may be
understood as, "reciprocal agreements to share patent rights."16
These broad definitions of patent pooling are wide enough to include cross-
licensingP As some authors maintain, the most basic form of pool is the
bilateral or cross-licensing of related patents among individual patent
owners, whereby each patent holder grants the other(s) a nonexclusive
13 See Phillip E. AREEDA, Herbert HOVENKAMP and Roger BLAIR, Antitrust Law: An
Analysis ofAntitrust Principles and Their Application, 2nd ed., Vol. 12, New York, Aspen Law &
Business, 2000, p. 232.
14 See United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.s. 287, 313 n. 24 (1948).
15 See Masako WAKUI, «Standardisation and Patent Pools in Japan: Their Effects on Valuing
IP and Limits Under Competition Law», in Ruth TAPLIN (ed.), Valuing Intellectual Property
in Japan, Britain and the United States, New York, RoutIedgeCurzon, 2004, p. 81, at page 84.
16 J.A. NEWBERG, loco cit., note 9, 2. As Andewelt pointed out, the common feature of all
patent pools is a mutual agreement among patent owners to forgo the enforcement of their
patent rights, effectively granting each other immunity from an infringement suit. See Roger
B. ANDEWELT, «Analysis of Patent Pools Under the Antitrust Laws», (1984-1985) 53
Antitrust L. ]. 611,611.
17 See e.g., Frank GRASSLER and Mary Ann CAPRIA, «Patent Pooling: Uncorking a
Technology Transfer Bottleneck and Creating Value in the Biomedical Research Field»,
(2003) 9 Journal ofCommercial Biotechnology 111,111. Others have remarked, that, " [p]atent
pools have diverse organizational forms, ranging from informal understandings that look
like multiparty cross-licensing arrangements, to pools that are institutions in their own right
and behave in some respect like joint ventures." John E. HAAPALA, Jr., «Patent Pools and
Antitrust Concerns in Plant Biotechnology», (2004) 19 Journal ofEnvironmental Law &
Litigation 475, 482.
5license to use its patented technology, and the other(s) reciprocate in kind.l8
However, although we might include cross-licensing in the term 'patent
pooling', as a matter of practice, patent pools and cross-licences differ
dramatically in some important ways.19
Cross-licensing arrangements do not typically involve a separate entity to
hold patents, whereas patent pools are generally distinguished by the fact
that they involve a distinct, neutral organization or holding company that is
established to administer the pool. This entity may either be one of the
original patent holders, or more commonly, a newly formed entity that is
independent of the patentees, designed specifically to administer the patent
pool.2° The pool members assign their patents to the organization, which
effectively acts as a trustee or agent for them, and who in turn licenses all of
the patents back to each member and to third parties willing to pay the pre-
determined royalties.21 In contrast to patent pools, cross-licensing parties
mutually execute licenses in order to access each other's patented
technology.22 Additionally, these licenses can be negotiated and
individually tailored to the parties' particular needs; while patent pools
generally offer little or no flexibility to change any terms of participation or
to individualize contracts with specific licensees.23
18 See P.E. AREEDA, H. HOVENKAMP and R. BLAIR, op. cit., note 13, p. 232.
19 See generally LarryM. GOLDSTEIN and Brian N. KEARSEY, Technology Patent Licensing:
An International Reference on 21st Century Patent Licensing, Patent Pools and Patent Platfonns,
Boston, Aspatore Books, 2004, p. 67-72.
20 See C. SHAPIRO, op. cit., note 4, p. 134.
21 See P.E. AREEDA, H. HOVENKAMP and R. BLAIR, op. cit., note 13, p. 232. See also, R.
ANDEWELT, loco cit., note 16,611. Vaughn compares the pool to a trust. See Floyd L.
VAUGHAN, The United States Patent System: Legal and Economic Conflicts in American Patent
History, Norman, Okla., University of Oklahoma Press, 1956, p. 40.
22 See S.c. CARLSON, loco cit., note 10, 369.
23 For a comparison on the differences between patent pools and bilateral licensing, on the
one hand and patent platforms, on the other, see L.M. GOLDSTEIN and B.N. KEARSEY, op.
cit., note 19, p. 67-72.
6Nevertheless, it is important to point out, although cross-licenses and patent
pools differ in organization and structure, this has little, if any, effect on the
antitrust analysis of these mechanisms.24 As we shall see in the following
section, both cross-licensing and patent pools were used by various firms in
a range of industries at various times over the past century to effectuate
cartels or cartel-like control. Indeed, both mechanisms are treated similarly
by the 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property
(hereinafter the Antitrust IP Guidelines or Guidelines).25
Finally, there is no single reason or motivation for creating a patent poo126
and no single protocol for how members organize and implement their
pooling agreements.27 Generally speaking, patent pools make all the patents
they hold available to all members and will sometimes make them available
to non-members on standard licensing terms. A procedure is devised by
which revenues generated from licensing are distributed among members.28
However, there is considerable variance among pools, for example, in terms
of royalty sharing formulae and whether licensing to third parties is
permitted and on what terms. In fact, a particular advantage to patent pools
is their flexibility and the fact that they can be tailored to the particular
24 See P.E. AREEDA, H. HOVENKAMP and R. BLAIR, op. cit., note 13, p. 232.
25 See S.c. CARLSON, loco cit., note 10, 369-370. Accordingly, for the purposes of our
discussion on the anti-competitive effects of pools, this paper will draw liberally from cross-
licensing cases, where appropriate, to illustrate certain points.
26 See Randall PARISH and Reiner JARGOSCH, «Using the Industry Model to Create
Physical Science Patent Pools among Academic Institutions», (2003) 15 Association of
University Technology Managers Journal 65, 67. The authors suggest the motivation for
establishing patent pools among universities is somewhat different from the motivations
found in industry.
27 See David SERAFINO, «Survey of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety of Purposes and
Management Structures», Research Note, Knowledge Ecology International, Oune 4,2007),
online: <http:j jwww.keionIine.orgjmisc-docsjds-patentpools.pdf>. p. 2.
The author surveyed 35 patent pools from 1856 to the present in order to determine
particular set of policy objectives and circumstances underlying the pools' formation and
organization.
28 See Robert P. MERGES, «Institutions for Intellectual Property Exchange: The Case of
Patent Pools», in Rochelle DREYFUSS, Diane L. ZIMMERMAN and Harry FIRST (ed.),
Expanding the Boundaries ofIntellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society.
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, 123 at page 129.
7group of patentees or a particular industry. Membership in a patent pool is
voluntary. A recent study has shown that as many as one half to two-thirds
of the eligible firms choose not to join a patent pool.29 The authors identified
a number of factors that influence whether a patent owner will join a pool.
For example, they determined that whether a firm joins a pool will depend
on such things as whether it is vertically integrated, the number of claims
per patent, the size of the founding member groups and whether the pool
has numeric proportional sharing rules.3D
Patent pools "produce an intermediate level of contract detail, reflecting not
only collective industry expertise but also the need for efficiency in carrying
out a high volume of transactions."31 As patents pools are essentially
contractual arrangements, parties are free to structure the pools however
they see fit, subject of course, to the dictates of existing laws and
regulations. The formation of a patent pool is not without its challenges.
There are costs involved in building the pool and negotiating its
organizational structure and the particular arrangements such as the royalty
rates.32
1.2. A Brief History of Patent Pools
One can trace the intellectual history of patent pools to medieval guilds,
which were one of the earliest institutions to facilitate innovation through
29 See Anne LAYNE-FARRAR and Josh LERNER. «To Join or Not to Join: Examining Patent
Pool Participation and Rent Sharing Rules», (November 15, 2006), online: <http://ssm.com
I abstract=945189>, p. 30
30 Id. Jay Choi developed a framework to analyze the incentives to form a patent in light of
the uncertainty of patent protection. See generally, J.P. CHOI, lac. cit., note 8. With respect to
vertical integration, a recent study has shown that it reduces double marginalization and
weakens the incentive to raise rivals' costs. See Sung-Hwan KIM, «Vertical Structure and
Patent Pools», (2004) 25 Review ofIndustrial Organization 231.
31 R.P. MERGES, lac. cit., note 9, 1295-1296.
32 See J.E. HAAPALA, Jr., lac. cit., note 17,483-487.
8the sharing of technological knowledge.33 Although the guilds themselves
eventually faded from the picture under changing economic conditions,
several features persist in present institutions, which mirror those found in
those early guilds.34
A number of industries employed processes of 'collective invention'
through patent pOOls.35 The first patent pool in North America was formed
in 1856 by sewing machine manufacturers. The Great Sewing Machine
Combination, made it possible for any manufacturer to license all the
patents for a fee of fifteen dollars per machine. The pool was proposed by
Orlando Potter at a meeting of major manufacturers in Albany, New York,
as a means of avoiding litigation that might have destroyed the nascent
industry.36 In the 1870s, the Bessemer Association was formed, as a patent
pool of all essential patents required in the production of Bessemer steeP7
By the 1890s General Electric and Westinghouse had monopolized a
substantial part of the American electrical manufacturing industry. As these
two giants gradually eliminated smaller competitors, the competition
between them intensified. In 1896 the two companies entered into a
corporate patent-pooling agreement, motivated in large part by each firm
33 Robert P. MERGES, «From Medieval Guilds to Open Source Software: Informal Norms,
Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation», (November 13, 2004), online: <http://ssm.
comlabstract=661543>, p. 3. Two authors call into question the current positive view of
merchant guilds. See Sheilagh OGILVIE and Roberta DESSI, «Social Capital and Collusion:
The Case of Merchant Guilds», CESifo Working Paper No. 1037, (September 2003), online:
<http://ssm.com/abstract=449263>.
34 See R.P. MERGES, loco cit., note 33, 18-19.
35 See Alessandro NUVOLARI, «Collective Invention During the British Industrial
Revolution: The Case of the Cornish Pumping Engine», (2004) 28 Cambridge Journal of
Economics 347, 360.
36 See Anderson ASHBURN, «The Machine Tool Industry: The Crumbling Foundation», in
Donald A. HICKS (ed.), Is New Technology Enough? Making and Remaking U.S. Basic Industries,
Washington, D.C., American Enterprises Institute, 1988, p. 19 at page 31. See also, Ross
THOMSON, «Learning by Selling and Invention: The Case of the Sewing Machine», (1987)
47 Journal ofEconomic History 433 and Grace Rogers COOPER, The Sewing Machine: Its
Invention and Development, 2nd ed., Washington, D.C., Smithsonian Books, 1977.
9having been successful in litigating specific claims (General Electric with
respect to a certain railway apparatus, Westinghouse with respect to Nikola
Tesla's patents on the rotating magnetic field) as well as the number of
remaining outstanding claims.38
Other pools followed. Six manufacturers of harrows (cultivating
implements set with spikes, spring teeth, or disks) formed the National
Harrows Company of New York around the turn of the twentieth century
and eight manufacturers of in the business of seeding and processing raisins
assigned their patents on the processes to a corporate entity they formed in
return for uniform licenses to use all the patents.39 In 1916, a simple pooling
agreement emerged in the davenport bed industry when several patent
owners, holding patents related to folding beds and other similar devices
entered into an agreement providing exclusive license to the Seng Company
to manufacture and sell under the pool patents.40 The key manufacturers of
the glass industry pooled their patents on various types of glass-making
machines in the Hartford-Empire patent pool and aggressively sought to
obtain any patents that threatened the pool's dominance. At its peak in 1938,
Hartford-Empire/Owens had amassed over 600 patents.41
Over the first half of the twentieth century, pools were also formed for such
devices as variable condensers, rail joint bars, air conditioning equipment,
flat glass, high-tension cables, and elastic-top hosiery and machinery.42 It is
important to note, however, that patent pools emerged not only in the
37 For a discussion of collective invention in the case of steel technology, see Robert C.
ALLEN, «Collective Invention», (1983) 4 Journal ofEconomic Behavior & Organization 1.
38 See David F. NOBLE, America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise ofCorporate
Capitalism, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1977, p. 10.
39 See F.L. VAUGHAN, op. cit., note 21, p. 41-43.
40 See RP. MERGES, loco cit., note 9,1344-1345.
41 See S.c. CARLSON, loco cit., note 10, 374-375.
42 See F.L. VAUGHAN, op. cit., note 21, p. 52-61.
10
manufacturing sector but in other sectors as well, notably among railroads.43
As well, ten producers of motion picture films organized a patent pool,
whereby several of them licensed their patents to the newly formed Motion
Picture Patents Company.44
One of the most significant patent pools existed in the automobile industry.
From the very beginning, it became evident that patent infringement
presented a serious problem. In 1879, patent attorney George B. Selden
applied for a patent on a vehicle propelled by an internal combustion
engine operating on hydrocarbon fue1.45 Through clever legal maneuvering,
(" .. .selden's claims were withdrawn, modified, and reworded time after
time in the years following 1879"46) he succeeded in delaying effective date
for the patent by 16 years.47 He was thus able to effectively profit from the
anticipated later market boom in production on a patent that would have
otherwise expired in 1896.
By 1900 the industry was growing rapidly and Selden's company brought
suit for patent infringement against the Winton Motor Carriage Company of
Cleveland, Ohio (the largest maker of gasoline automobiles in the U.S. at
that time). The patent was upheld and Winton and other manufacturers
sought to avoid further litigation. In March 1903, Selden's Electric Vehicle
Company and eighteen other manufacturers formed the Association of
43 See Steven W. USSELMAN, «Patents Purloined: Railroads, Inventors, and the Diffusion of
Innovation in 19th-Century America», (1991) 32 Technology and Culture 1047, 1049.
44 See F.L. VAUGHAN, op. cit., note 21, p. 46. There were some challenges to this pool. See
United States v. Motion Picture Patents Company, 225 F. 800 (E.D. Pa. 1915).
45 Charles A. WELSH, «Patents and Competition in the Automobile Industry», (1948) 13 Law
& Contemporary Problems 260, 263.
46 Id., 264.
47 See Ralph C. EPSTEIN, The Automobile Industry, its Economic and Commercial Development,
Chicago A.W. Shaw, 1928, p. 227.
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Licensed Automobile Manufacturers (A.L.A.M.).48 Not everyone joined the
A.L.A.M., notably Thomas L. Jeffery and Henry Ford, were not members.49
On October 22, 1903 the A.L.A.M. continued its legal battle by filing suit
with the Ford Motor Company, and what followed was a messy public
relations battle. On September 16, 1909, the court found in favour of the
Selden patent. However, the 1909 decision was overturned in the Circuit
Court of Appeals on January 9, 1911.50 The decision effectively removed the
hegemony from A.L.A.M. and lead to its dissolution (in 1912). The industry
manufacturers were now prepared to reconsider a mechanism for the
interchange of patents.51
The result was the Automobile Manufacturers Association (AMA), which
emerged in 1915. The pool was quite large, composed of seventy-nine
companies controlling some 350 patents. The pool grew to cover two
hundred members and 547 patents by 1925 and over one thousand patents
by 1932.52 The pooling agreement is generally viewed as having been a great
success; in the words of one author, "putting an institutionalized end to
ubiquitous litigation."53 The arrangement was lauded far and wide as a
48 C.AWELSH, loco cit., note 45, 265.
49 Ford was actually refused entry into AL.AM. The other members claimed he was merely
an assembler - not a manufacturer - of automobiles, and therefore should be excluded. See
Edward D. KENNEDY, The Automobile Industry: The Coming ofAge ofCapitalism's Favorite
Child, New York, Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941, p. 45. Because he was not a member, Ford could
not use the patents on the Dyer patents for the sliding gear transmission that was held by
the AL.AM. pool. Consequently, he used the planetary transmission in his Model T and
earlier cars. As a precautionary measure, took out a license in 1905 from the man who
claimed to be its inventor. See William GREENLEAF, Monopoly on Wheels: Henry Ford and the
Selden Automobile Patent, Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1961, p. 243.
50 Columbia Motor Car Company V. c.A. Duerr & Company, 184 Fed. 893 (2d Cir. 1911). See
C.AWELSH, loco cit., note 45, 266.
51 See W. GREENLEAF, op. cit., note 49, p. 244
52 Id., p. 245-246.
53 R.P. MERGES, op. cit., note 28, p. 138.
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success, even by no less an opponent of the patent system as Walton
Hamilton.54
Apart from the automobile pool, the two most notable pools of the early
twentieth century were the radio and the aircraft patent pool. Both pools
were created under the impetus of the United States government
(particularly through the U.S. Navy) in light of World War 1.
During the war, the patents of firms holding radio patents were combined
in order to facilitate the war effort. By the outset of World War I, a stalemate
had arisen given the firms patent disputes; with the pooling, research and
development in radio technology resumed, and at a rapid pace.55
With the end of the war, the impasse resurfaced. When the U.S. Navy
learned that the deadlock might be broken with British Marconi Company
purchasing the Alexanderson alternator from General Electric, they (as well
as President Wilson) pressured General Electric, to withhold its patents and
attempt to form in a cartel so as to ensure American control of radio.56
General Electric (GE) formed a privately owned corporation to acquire the
assets of the wireless radio company American Marconi from British
Marconi and organize what would become the Radio Corporation of
America (RCA).
The organization was formally incorporated on October 17, 1919. It pooled
patents held by GE, AT&T, Westinghouse, Western Electric and United
Food Company among others and eventually all companies in the patent
conflict joined the radio-patent pool. Like the Manufacturer's Aircraft
54 See Walton H. HAMILTON, Patents and Free Enterprise, Temporary National Economic
Committee, Monograph No. 31, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1941.
55 See D.F. NOBLE, op. cit., note 38, p. 93-94.
56 [d.
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Association, RCA consolidated these blocking patent rights with the
blessing of the u.s. Navy, which needed to get radios into productionP The
pool also collected patents, necessary to implement Federal
Communications Commission standards.58
Likewise, World War I played a role in the formation of a patent pool
among aircraft manufacturers. Patent disputes had persisted in the industry
since the Wright brothers obtained their patent in 1906.59 The Wrights
primary competition came from Glenn Curtiss, along with Alexander
Graham Bell, introduced wing flaps (or ailerons) to improve lateral control
aircraft, they applied for a patent in 1911. By 1915 all aircraft were using the
Curtiss wing flaps, which were more effective and reliable than the Wright's
method.60
The Wrights appeared to have won in the courts, as their patent was
interpreted broadly in a series of cases.61 Interestingly, despite losing the
litigation war to the Wright Brothers, it was Curtiss that ultimately became
the Army and Navy's main supplier.62
Both the Wrights and Curtiss tired of litigation and sold their interests, but
the successor firms continued the patent dispute through the courts, and
57 Suzanne SCOTCHMER, Innovation and Incentives, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2004, p. 176.
58 See M. WAKUI, op. cit., note 15, p. 84.
59 Jacob A. VANDER MEULEN, The Politics ofAircraft .. Building an American Military
Industry, Lawrence, Kan., University Press of Kansas, 1991, p. 19.
60 See George BITTLINGMAYER, «Property Rights, Progress, and the Aircraft Patent
Agreemenb>, (1988) 31 J. L. & Econ. 227,231.
61 See Herbert A. JOHNSON, «The Wright Patent Wars and Early American Aviation»,
(2004) 69 Journal ofAir Law & Commerce 21, 21; J.A. VANDER MEULEN, op. cit., note 59, p.
19. Interestingly, the judge who upheld the Wright's claims in 1910 and 1913 - Judge John R.
Hazel of the District Court of Southern New York - was also the judge who recognized
George Selden as the inventor of the automobile in 1900. See G. BITTLINGMAYER, loco cit.,
note 60, 231, note 15.
62 See H.A. JOHNSON, loco cit., note 61, 22.
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aggressively asserted their patent claims against other competitors.63
Howard Coffin, director of the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics Henry B. Mingle, a New York City lawyer and president of the
Standard Aircraft Corporation, suggested a trade association built around a
patent pool. They promoted their Aircraft Manufacturers' Association
(AMA). Most manufactures joined, besides Wright-Martin (which held the
controlling patent), who resisted, threatening to sue any infringers.64 The
scale of the problem was growing (192 aeronautic patents had been
approved by mid-1917) and so was criticism of the industry. As a result,
Coffin and NACA were moved to utilize the government's leverage to
impose a patent pool on the industry.65 Wright-Martin eventually
acquiesced when Congress passed legislation that would have condemned
the patents. The Manufacturers Aircraft Association (MAA) was
incorporated in New York on July 16, 1917, and its first meeting was held on
July 24, 1917, where the patent pool was formally created. Curtiss-Burgess
agreed to a licensing plan administered by the MAA on July 26, 1917.
Although we may never know the details of the patent litigation between
Wright and Curtiss it seems clear that it was this litigation that ultimately
lead to the formation of the aircraft patent pool. The federal government,
intent upon increased wartime production of aircraft essential forced the
parties to cooperate. 66 The Aircraft Manufacturers' Association was one of
the most probed patent pools and though it was challenged on several
63 See J.A. VANDER MEDLEN, op. cit., note 59, p. 19.
64 See G. BITTLINGMAYER, loco cit., note 60, 232.
65 See J.A. VANDER MEDLEN, op. cit., note 59, p. 20.
66 Harry A. TODLMIN Jr., «Patent Pools and Cross Licenses», (1935) 22 Virginia L. Rev. 119,
125; H.A. JOHNSON, loco cit., note 61,21. Interestingly, "[t]he Manufacturers's Aircraft
Association, the patent pool imposed upon the industry by government during the war, was
of little use to manufacturers outside the tiny area of commercial aircraft since patents for
military aircraft were allowed no legal standing. See J.A. VANDER MEDLEN, op. cit., note
59, p. 64.
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occasions by government agencies it was always upheld. 67 The pool was
amended in 1928 and ultimately dismantled in 1975 by a consent decree.68
Often ignored is the fact that several important patent pools extended
beyond national borders. Notably, Siemens and Halske, A.E.G., and the
German Incandescent Gas-burner Company created the Drahtkonzern
(Filament Trust) in 1911, which was a patent pool. Within the next year
British firms had entered into the pooling arrangement, which was followed
by agreements with firms in France, Holland and Austria-Hungary. 69 In
1921, a group of European lamp manufacturers entered into a cross-
licensing agreement, and were soon joined by the American General Electric
and the Osram Company. Three years later, an international agreement was
signed, by which there was an interchange of patents and research results
between a large number of electric lamp companies. The United States and
Canada, however, did not sign. A similar agreement was signed in 1932,
between Imperial Chemical Industries, the I.G. Ferbnindustrie A.G., the
National French and three Swiss companies. Similar arrangements were
reported by the American concerns and companies in England.
Prior to 1941 there were many cartel agreements, resting primarily on
patents, between German companies and companies within the United
States, which "brought about an international interlocking of interests and
of capital ownership which, unlike multinational corporate structuring, was
more easily hidden from the observer's eye and remained largely outside
the territory of cartel legislation."70
67 See H.A. TOULMIN Jr., lac. cit., note 66, 144.
68 See G. BITTLINGMAYER, lac. cit., note 60, 227.
69 See H.A. TOULMIN Jr., lac. cit., note 66, 150-151.
70 Ad TEULINGS, <<Interlocking Interests and Collaboration with the Enemy: Corporate
Behaviour in the Second World War», (1982) 3 Organization Studies 99, 102.
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Neither the American companies themselves, nor the American
government, forced an end to these agreements, which entailed serious
consequences. For example, the production of synthetic rubber in the
United States was delayed until 1943 because Standard Oil (of New Jersey)
adhered to agreements it made with I.G. Farben in the years 1938 to 1940.71
The cooperation between these two companies was based on an underlying
agreement whereby Standard Oil would stay outside the chemicals market
if I.G. Farben would stay away from the world market of oil derivatives.
This provided the foundation for a carefully regulated patent pool for their
patents relating to the domain of coal and chemicals.72
It is important to point out that, from the very beginning, patent pools were
formed by firms seeking to, "break patent-related bottlenecks"73 In some
cases, these patent pools were created after having experienced phases of
slow innovation due to the existence of blocking patents.74 Indeed, recall
that the first patent pool, which was formed in the 19th century, emerged to
deal with intellectual property conflicts in the sewing machine industry.
Likewise, the creation of the Bessemer Association in the steel industry and
the railway patent pool are attributed an almost "indissoluble technological
deadlock" that arose because basic patents were held by different firms.75
Additionally, patent pools helped consolidate blocking patents that were
plaguing both the radio and aircraft industries. In the world of increasing
intellectual property it is increasingly common for several firms to control
property rights that must be combined in order to manufacture an end
product. In other words, blocking patents are not unusual, especially in
high-tech markets (where a given end product may incorporate dozens, if
71 Id.
72 Id., 103.
73 KP. MERGES, loco cit., note 33, 4.
74 See A. NUVOLARI, loco cit., note 35, 360.
75 Id., 360; See also Steven W. USSELMAN, loco cit., note 43.
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not hundreds of patents).76 Consolidating blocking patents also helps
overcome the uncertainties and expense of patent litigation. This was a
major factor in the creation of the automobile pool as it was in GE's
electrical manufacturing pOOF7
While patent pools can overcome obstacles created by patents and reduce
transaction costs, they are also, "breeding grounds for abuse."78 Many pools
served as a shelter for collusion in the early part of the twentieth century, as
there was little precedent for using competition to restrict the freedom of
patentees to engage in these licensing practices.79 Early court opinions
generally refrained from subjecting patent-related conduct to antitrust
scrutiny. Courts seemed "to immunize from antitrust scrutiny the conduct
of firms holding patents," even when they were clearly engaged in
anticompetitive practices.80 Indeed, in 1902, in the case of E. Bement & Sons
v. National Harrow Company 81which arose from the formation of the
aforementioned National Harrows Company, the United States Supreme
Court effectively ruled that patent law superseded antitrust regulations by
exempting a pooling arrangement that amounted to outright price-fixing,
with no transfer of technology or other efficiency at all from antitrust
scrutiny.82 In coming to this decision, the Court confirmed the dominance of
76 See Carl SHAPIRO, «Setting Compatibility Standards: Cooperation or Collusion?», in
Rochelle DREYFUSS, Diane 1. ZIMMERMAN and Harry FIRST (ed.), Expanding the
Boundaries ofIntellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2001, p. 81 at page 93-94.
77 See W. GREENLEAF, op. cit., note 49, p. 242-243; D.F. NOBLE, op. cit., note 38, p. 10.
78 Bradley J. LEVANG, «Evaluating the Use of Patent Pools for Biotechnology: A Refutation
to the USPTO White Paper Concerning Biotechnology Patent Pools», (2002) Santa Clara
Compo & High Tech. L. J. 229, 237.
79 See S.c. CARLSON, loco cit., note 10, 373.
80 See Sheila F. ANTHONY, «Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: From Adversaries to
Partners», (2000) 28 AIPLA Quarterly Journal 1, 5.
81 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
82 See William J. BAER and David A. BALTO, «Antitrust Enforcement and High-
Technology Markets», (1999) 5 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 73,78.
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patent law over federal competition law.83 This decision left the U.S.
government incapable of applying Sherman Act in many cases, leading
numerous firms to form patent pools which were effectively immune from
competition regulation.84 However, " ... the view of what is acceptable
changed, perhaps as a result of the excesses catalogued in Bement. Courts
began viewing patent pools as a mechanism for cartels to engage in
collective price setting or output restrictions."85
By 1912, the courts swung in the other direction and began to condemn
patent pooling as a practice that did in fact violate competition law. 86 In
Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United States87 the Court condemned a
patent pool for enamelware that was used to set sales prices and impose
purchase restrictions. The Court ruled that the Sherman Act imposed
"appropriate limits" on such abuses.88 Subsequent cases upheld this line of
reasoning, as, courts continued to strike down patent pooling arrangements
in a number of industries, including motion pictures.89
The abovementioned Hartford-Empire patent pool was also the focus of
litigation. In a 1945 decision, the Supreme Court dissolved the notorious
glass manufacturing patent pool, which accounted for 94% of America's
glass production.9o The pool was essentially a manufacturing cartel which
used its patent portfolio as its leverage to force competitors to sell out to the
83 See S.c. CARLSON, loco cit., note 10, 373-374. See also, Richard J. GILBERT, «Antitrust for
Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolutioll», (2004) Stan. Tech. 1. Rev. 3,4, online: <http:j j
works.bepress.comjrichard_gilbertj11>.
84 See B.J. LEVANG, loco cit., note 78, 237-238.
85 See Dorothy Gill RAYMOND, «Benefits and Risks of Patent Pooling for Standards Setting
Organizations», (2002) 16 Antitrust 41, 41.
86 Daniel LIN, «Research Versus Development: Patent Pooling, Innovation and
Standardization in the Software Industry», (2002) 1 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. 1. 274, 301.
87 226 U.s. 20 (1912).
88 See D. LIN, loco cit., note 86, 301.
89 See United States V. Motion Picture Patents Company, cited above, note 44. See generally FL.
VAUGHAN, op. cit., note 21, p. 46-47.
90 See Hartford-Empire Company V. United States, 323 U.s. 386 (1945).
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pool and orchestrate an industry-wide price-fixing agreement, allowing it to
maintain high prices despite improvements in technology and the onset of
the Great Depression.91 It was one of the largest patent pools in the history
of antitrust and intellectual property litigation. Justice Hugo Black is often
cited for his comments on the egregiousness of the pool: "The history of this
country has perhaps never witnessed a more completely successful
economic tyranny over any field of industry than that accomplished by [the
members of the pool]."92 Some might argue that the pendulum swung too
far when the Supreme Court dismantled the patent pooling agreement in
United States v. Line Material CO.93 The court condemned the pool on the
basis that it included price maintenance provisions, even though it appears
that the patents involved were blocking.94 Several years earlier, the U.S.
Supreme Court had, in Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States95 emphasized
the benefits of pooling blocking and complementary patents.96
When the United States Department of Justice began to articulate its
antitrust policies in the late 1960s, it followed the lead of the judiciary in
expressing hostility and suspicion towards restraints caused by patent
licensing arrangements. The Justice Department viewed pools skeptically
and took the position that they should be treated more severely under the
antitrust laws. With the publication of the Department of Justice's 'Nine No-
Nos' regarding patent licensing, under which the Justice Department
viewed suspect practices as per se illegal, "patent pools nearly disappeared
from the business landscape."97 The Nine No-No's created a hostile
91 See F.L. VAUGHAN, op. cit., note 21/ p. 82.
92 323 U.S. 386/ 436-437 (1945).
93 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
94 See W.J. BAER and D.A. BALTO, lac. cit., note 82/ 78.
95 283 U.S. 163/174 (1931)
96 It has been suggested that the difference between the Standard Oil and Line Material cases,
is that is that, "the cross-licensing arrangements in the former did not explicitly fix prices for
gasoline made with the licensed technology." See R.J. GILBERT, lac. cit., note 83/ 7.
97 B.J. LEVANG, lac. cit., note 78/ 238.
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environment for the formation of patent pools.98 Firms were reluctant to
form pools in light of the hard line policies adopted by the antitrust
enforcement agencies.99
Beginning in the 1980s, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ began to question
the theoretical foundation of the Nine No-No's.1°0 Enforcement agencies
started to employ more sophisticated economic analysis to the interaction of
intellectual property and competition law.101 This resulted in the issuance of
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations in 1988, which
revised the official position of the antitrust enforcement regime. This was
followed in 1995 by the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property issued jointly by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission. Most recently, these agencies issued a report entitled, Antitrust
Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and
Competition, which was an outgrowth of the views expressed by numerous
individuals in industry, academia and the legal profession at a series of
hearings, beginning in February 2002.102
The introduction of the Antitrust IP Guidelines suggests the " ....that the
pendulum had swung back from the Nine No-No's, which had begun to be
questioned and reassessed in the late 1970s and early 1980s." 103 There was
an explicit recognition in the Guidelines that patent pooling is generally
procompetitive and should be subject to a rule of reason analysis.104
98 See D.G. RAYMOND, loco cit., note 85, 4l.
99 See A. LAYNE-FARRAR and J. LERNER, loco cit., note 29, 2-3.
100 See generally, Richard J. GILBERT and Carl SHAPIRO, «Antitrust Issues in the Licensing
of Intellectual Property: The Nine No-No's Meet the Nineties», (1997) 1997 Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity. Microeconomics, 283.
101 See generally, G. CLARKSON, loco cit., note 8, p. 20-2l.
102 The Hearings were entitled "Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the
Knowledge-Based Economy." See <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/index.shtrn> for
materials.
103 D.G. RAYMOND, loco cit., note 85, 4l.
104 Id.
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According to the Guidelines, "patent pools are acceptable and pro-
competitive when they integrate complementary technology, reduce
transaction costs, clear blocking patents, avoid infringement litigation, and
promote the dissemination of technology."lOS
In the 1990s, patent pools reappeared, although these pools were somewhat
different than their predecessors in that they largely dealt with patents
necessary to technical standards.106 Aside from the adoption of the Antitrust
IP Guidelines, 1995 also saw the establishment of the MPEG-2 standard by
the Moving Picture Experts Group of the International Standards
Organisation (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission. The
MPEG-2 pool began as an agreement among nine patent holders to combine
27 patents that are needed to meet an international standard known as
MPEG-2 video compression technology.lo7 The pool responded to the
problem of competing digital video formats, particularly resulting from
different compression techniques, by creating a single standard.l08 MPEG-2
Patent Portfolio License was created to assure the "interoperability and
implementation of digital video" by facilitating access to the technology on
fair and reasonable terms.109 Under the pooling agreement, the patent
holders all license their MPEG-2 patents to a central administrative entity
105 B.J. LEVANG, lac. cit., note 78, 238.
106 See Rudi BEKKER, Eric IVERSEN and Knut BLIND, «Patent Pools and Non-Assertion
Agreements: Coordination Mechanisms for Multi-Party IPR Holders in Standardization»
(Paper presented to the European Association for the Study of Science and Technology
Conference, University of Lausanne, Switzerland, August 2006) [unpublished], online:
<http://www2.unil.ch/easst2006/Papers/B/Bekkers%20Iversen%20Blind.pdf>, p.12.
107 See R.P. MERGES, op. cit., note 28, p. 147.
108 See Michael D. STEIN and Jeremiah BAUNACH, «The Ins and Outs of Patent Pooling»,
in From IP to IPO: Key Issues in Commercialising University Technology, Intellectual Asset
Magazine supplement (January 2005), online: <http://www.iam-magazine.com/issues/
complete.ashx?g=f9c5ede9-53fc-43e9-9d4f-14e61c43920a>, p. 63.
109 MPEG 2, «Introduction», online: <http://www.mpegla.com/m2>.
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known as MPEG LA, based in Denver. The MPEG LA collects and
distributes royalties and otherwise manages the pOOIS.1l0
A second pool, proposed by Philips, Sony, and Pioneer concerned a pool of
patents necessary to comply with the standards for the production of DVDs
and DVD piayers.lli Along with Hitachi, Matsushita Electric Industrial,
Time Warner, Victor Company of Japan, and Mitsubishi Electric
Corporation they formed the DVD-ROM and DVD-Video Formats II patent
pool. These pools have been broadly adopted in the industry, facilitating
acceptance of products using DVD technology.112 In the same year, the 1394
standard was developed, and associated pool was formed, with respect to
data transfer technologies.113
Developers and manufacturers of so-called Third Generation, or 3G, mobile
communications products have created a patent-pooling agreement dubbed
the 3G Patent Platform. This agreement makes standardized licensing
processes and fees available to all comers.114 It first received approval from
Japanese competition authorities in 2000, which was followed by approval
by European and American authorities in 2002.115 Several new pools have
110 See Michael BEDNAREK and Markus INEICHEN, «Patent Pools as an Alternative to
Patent Wars in Emergent Sectors», (2004) 16 Intellectual Prop. & Tech. L. ]. 1,4.
111 See S.F. ANTHONY, lac. cit., note 80, 5
112 See Michael D. STEIN and Jeremiah BAUNACH, «The Ins and Outs of Patent Pooling»,
in From IP to IPO: Key Issues in Commercialising University Technology, Intellectual Asset
Magazine supplement Oanuary 2005), online: <http:j jwww.iam-magazine.comjissuesj
complete.ashx?g=f9c5ede9-53fc-43e9-9d4f-14e61c43920a>, p. 63.
113 Id., 64.
114 See Michael R. FRANZINGER, «Latent Dangers in a Patent Pool: The European
Commission's Approval of the 3G Wireless Technology Licensing Agreements», (2003) 91
Cal. L. Rev. 1693,1697.
115 Although the Japanese Fair Trade Commission issued its preliminary opinion in 2000, its
decision was made official through the formal approval granted in June 2002. See M.R.
FRANZINGER, lac. cit., note 114,1697, note 14. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Press Release,
«Antitrust Clearance for Licensing of Patents for Third Generation Mobile Services»,
(November 12, 2002) online: <http:j jeuropa.eujrapidjpressReleasesAction.do?reference=
IPj02jI651&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>. American
approval came in the form of a business review letter. See, Letter from Charles A. James,
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been proposed recently, including the Multimedia Home Platform (DVB-
MHP) (2004), AVC/H.264 patent pool (2005), and the UNITAID pool for
AIDS medications, proposed in 2006.
As we have seen, patent pools have played a prominent role in the legal and
industrial history since 1856, although their number and importance
considerably subsided in a hostile antitrust environment after World War
II.l16 Antitrust jurisprudence and the regulation of patent pools by
competition authorities have shifted a great deal over the past hundred
years. The initial deference to pooling agreements in the early 1900s gave
way to great scrutiny and harsher treatment.117
It should be pointed out that U.S. antitrust history narrative commonly
depicts federal enforcement policy since 1960 as a swinging pendulum,
swinging from overly active in the 1960s and 1970s to too passive in the
1980s, and properly moderate in the 1990s. However, as one author has
pointed out, "[t]he narrative supplies an unacceptably inaccurate
representation of modern US. antitrust experience. The pendulum narrative
attains its force by artificially accentuating the swings in enforcement
activity across periods. With repeated recitals, the narrative flattens out
discordant facts that might suggest important elements of continuity or
progressive, cumulative improvement."118
Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, to Ky P. Ewing, Vinson &
Elkins, LLP (Nov. 12,2002), online: <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/
200455.pdf>.
116 See Josh LERNER and Jean TIROLE, «Efficient Patent Pools», (2004) 94 American Economic
Review 691, 691.
117 See D. UN, loco cit., note 86, 300.
118 William E. KOVACIC, «The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement
Norms», (2003) 71 Antitrust 1.]. 377,380. For an empirical study of the DOl's enforcement of
antitrust laws see Joseph c. GALLO, Kenneth DAU-SCHMIDT, Joseph L. CRAYCRAFT and
Charles J. PARKER, «Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement, 1955-1997: An Empirical
Study», (2000) 17 Review ofIndustrial Organization 75. The paper updated Richard A.
POSNER, «A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement», (1970) 13].1. & Ecan. 365.
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In any case, we have seen a return of patent pooling activity in recent years
under a more permissive approach under the 1995 Federal Antitrust
Intellectual Property Licensing Guidelines, leading many to believe that
pools are bound to be as important, if not more important in the new
economy as they were in traditional sectors.119 Nevertheless, the specter of
competition authority enforcement lingers and has caused a decline in the
formation of patent pools despite the potential benefits and efficiencies of
properly structured pools.
1.3. Differences in the American and Canadian Approaches
to Patent Pool Enforcement
To this point, the paper has discussed patent pools in light of American
history, jurisprudence and the enforcement approach of the u.s.
enforcement agencies, notably, the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission. There has been no reference to Canadian jurisprudence
on patent pools or the enforcement approach of Canadian authorities. This
is due to the fact that to date, the only Canadian patent pool case is Philco
Products Ltd., et. al. v. Thermionics Ltd. et. al.,120 which dealt with the
unsuccessful attempt of the alleged infringer to plead patent misuse
through conspiracy.
Moreover, the Competition Bureau's Intellectual Property Enforcement
Guidelines (IPEGs) - which contains the Canadian Competition Bureau's
views on the interface between intellectual property rights and competition
law as well as the analytical framework used by the Bureau to assess
conduct involving intellectual property - to a certain degree reflects what
119 See J. LERNER and J. TIROLE, loco cit., note 116, 691.
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can be found in the Antitrust IP Guidelines,121 While the approaches of
Canadian and American enforcement agencies differ in some respects, the
Competition Bureau is known to pay considerable attention to the
enforcement activities of both the FTC and the DO] in investigating and
reviewing the conduct of firms in Canada.l22 Consider for example, the
hypothetical patent pool situation offered by the Canadian Competition
Bureau, as an example of where the Bureau may intervene.
//ABC and ZENIX have each developed a revolutionary new X-ray imaging
machine to help diagnose cancer. Each firm has been granted a series of
patents on certain components of their respective machines, and the
machines themselves are functionally interchangeable. ABC's machine does
not infringe on any of ZENIX's patents; however, the design of one of the
components of the ZENIX machine may infringe on one of ABC's patents.
ABC has threatened to sue ZENIX for patent infringement if ZENIX begins
marketing its machine without getting a license from ABC to use the
component. ZENIX disputes ABC's claim of patent infringement. However,
to avoid a messy court battle, the companies have placed their various
patents in a patent pool. The pool has established a $500 licensing fee, which
is to be paid to the pool each time an X-ray imaging machine produced by
either firm is used in a medical diagnosis. The proceeds from the license fees
are split between the two firms according to a predetermined formula. As a
result, neither firm is likely to charge medical practitioners less than $500 per
procedure .//123
In its discussion of this imaginary pool, the Bureau stated, that it,
" .. .recognizes that a patent pooling arrangement may provide pro-
competitive benefits by, among other things, clearing blocking patents,
avoiding costly infringement litigation, integrating complementary
120 [1943] S.C.K 396.
121 See Michael TREBILCOCK, Ralph A. WINTER, Paul COLLINS and Edward M.
IACOBUCCI, The Law and Economics ofCanadian Competition Policy, Toronto, University of
Toronto Press, 2002, p. 632, 635-636. //The IPEGs, however, are said to reflect a uniquely
Canadian approach. In contrast to the U.s. guidelines, which focus exclusively on the
licensing of IP, the draft IPEGs address a broader range of conduct and transactions,
including mergers and refusals to deal involving IP.// Id.
122 See STIKEMAN ELLIOTT, «Antitrust Authorities' Scrutiny of IP Agreements Can Be
High», Intellectual Property Update, (July 2001), p. 1, online: <http:j jwww.stikeman.comj
newslettjIpJul01.pdf>.
123 COMPETITION BUREAU, Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines, Hull, The
Bureau, 2000, online: <http:j jstrategis.ic.gc.cajpicsjctjipege.pdf>, p. 22.
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technologies and reducing transaction costs."124 This language is virtually
identical to that employed in the U.S. Antitrust IP Guidelines which states,
"[t]hese arrangements [cross-licensing and patent pooling] may provide
procompetitive benefits by integrating complementary technologies,
reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly
infringement litigation."125 It is also worth noting that there are significant
similarities between the u.s. IP Guidelines the EU's Technology Transfer
Block Exemption (TTBE) and Guidelines, despite the fact that us Guidelines
and the ED's TTBE and Guidelines do not look much alike on the surface.126
In brief, the U.S. Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property, adopt, "a systematic economic effects-based approach to
evaluating intellectual property licensing agreements..."127 which is
fundamentally the same as the approach adopted in Canada. This,
combined with the lack of any substantial Canadian case law128 and the fact
124 Id., p. 24.
125 U.s. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing ofIntellectual Property, Washington, D.C., U.s. Department of
Justice & Federal Trade Commission, 1995, § 5.5, p. 28, online: <http:j jwww.usdoj.govj
atrjpublicjguidelinesj0558.pdf>.
126 See Makan DELRAHIM, «US and EU Approaches to the Antitrust Analysis of Intellectual
Property Licensing: Observations from the Enforcement Perspective», (Remarks presented
at the American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, Spring Meeting, Washington,
D.C., April 1, 2004), online: <www.usdoj.govjatrjpublicjspeechesj203228.pdf>,p.5.
However, the similarity should not be overstated. There remain significant, substantive
differences between the two approaches. See pp. 7-8.
127 Id., 3.
128 Although there is no case, apart from Philco Products, dealing directly with patent pools,
there is a body of case law that may be seized upon by enforcement agencies in dealing with
pools. For example, in Eli Lilly and Co. v. Apotex Inc., [2005] F.C.I. No 1818, 2005 FCA 361, the
Federal Court of Appeal held that the assignment of a patent can lessen competition unduly,
contrary to section 45 of the Competition Act, if it results in an increase to the assignee's
market power greater than that inherent in the patents assigned. See Brian A. FACEY and
Dany H. ASAF, Competition & Antitrust Law: Canada & the United States, 3d ed., Markham,
LexisNexis Butterworths, 2006, p. 492. This could, conceivably be used to challenge a patent
pool, in which individual patent owners assign or license their patents to a pool. This was
expressly considered by Lawson A. W. HUNTER and D. Jeffrey BROWN, «The Competition
Act and Intellectual Property: The Intriguing Case of the Square Peg and the Round Hole»,
(Paper presented to The Strategy Institute Conference on The Competition Bureau's
Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines, October 21, 1999), p. 11. Patent pools might
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that the IPEGs approach to pooling is practically indistinguishable from the
approach adopted in the Antitrust IP Guidelines, we are confident in
suggesting the theoretical, economic arguments underlying this thesis, as
well as the prescriptive elements set out below, would apply equally in
Canada as in the U.S.129 This is important, because as pools become more
pervasive, we are likely to see a number of them emerge in Canada, with a
corresponding rise in litigation and enforcement actions.
II. Intellectual Property, Transaction Costs and the
Emergence of Patent Pools
The rapidly increasing number of patents issued, while greatly beneficial for
the creation of private incentives for research, generates a spiral of
overlapping intellectual property rights in the hands of different owners,
with the unintended consequence of creating an obstacle to future research:
the tragedy of the anticommons. There is a point where too many property
rights owned by too many parties creates a legal 'smog',130 that is, an
anticommons. In contrast to the tragedy of the commons (where resource
overuse is due by a lack of property rights)131 in the tragedy of the
anticommons, a resource is prone to underuse because multiple owners each
also receive consideration as a joint abuse of dominance contrary of Section 79 of the
Canadian Competition Act.
129 Despite tremendous similarity in approach between the U.s. and Canadian perspective
on the licensing intellectual property, there remain significant differences in competition
law between both countries. For example, U.s. courts have maintained that a licensor does
not have to offer a royalty rate that is acceptable to the licensee. By way of contrast, in some
early Canadian cases, an 'unreasonably' high royalty rate was viewed as a refusal to deal
and compulsory licenses were issued. See M. TREBILCOCK, RA. WINTER, P. COLLINS
and E.M. IACOBUCCI, op. cit., note 121, p. 617-618.
130 Giuseppe COLANGELO, «Avoiding the Tragedy of the Anticommons: Collective Rights
Organizations, Patent Pools and the Role of Antitrust», LE Lab Working Paper No. IP-01-2004,
(March 2004), online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=523122>, p. 14.
131 In a seminal paper in 1968, Garrett Hardin introduced the notion of the tragedy of the
commons. He highlighted how a resource would suffer the 'tragedy of the commons' where
it is prone to overuse because too many owners have a right to use the resource and no one
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have a right to exclude other right holders from a scarce resource and no
one has an effective privilege of use. 132 The anticommons is caused by the
proliferation of patents issued over increasingly smaller inputs, increasing
the number of elements that are needed to create a single end product.133 It
is this fragmentation of the rights contained in the single end product, in the
hands of several patent holders, that leads the tragedy of the
anticommons.134 This fragmentation leads to a divergence between the
rights of use and exclusion held by each of the various owners which in turn
produces welfare losses as the rational parties, acting individually, actually
underconsume the resource compared with a social optimum.135
Theoretically, at least, the disparate ownership of resources by itself is not
necessarily problematic in terms of the efficient use of resources. The Coase
Theorem stipulates that if the transfer of ownership rights is umestricted
and transaction costs are zero, individuals can overcome the tragedy of the
anticommons by reassigning their rights among each other. In other words,
an inefficient initial partitioning of property rights is not determinative of
whether the use of the resource will ultimately be efficient or not. However,
we don't live in a world of costless transactions. Hence, while earlier
economic theorists demonstrated a greater concern about the initial grant of
has the right to exclude the others. See Garrett HARDIN, «The Tragedy of the Commons»,
(1968) 162 Science 1243.
132 See Michael A. HELLER, «The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets», (1998) 111 Ham L. Rev. 621; Michael A. HELLER and Rebecca S.
EISENBERG, «Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research»,
(1998) 280 Science 698. For a recent discussion of the commons and anticommons analyses
see, Stephen R. MUNZER, «The Commons and the Anticommons in the Law and Theory of
Property», in Martin P. GOLDING and William A. EDMUNDSON (eds.), The Blackwell Guide
to the Philosophy ofLaw and Legal Theory, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2005, p. 148.
133 G. COLANGELO, loco cit., note 130, p. 14.
134 Id., p. 15; See also, Norbert SCHULZ, Francesco PARISI and Ben DEPOORTER,
«Fragmentation in Property: Towards a General Model», (2002) 158 Journal ofInstitutional &
Theoretical Economics 594 (proposing that the anticommons deadweight losses are an
increasing function in the following three factors: (a) number of property fragments; (b)
degree of complementarity of such fragments in subsequent uses; and (c) independence of
the pricing of such inputs by the fragmented property owners).
135 G. COLANGELO, loco cit., note 130, p. 14.
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property rights,l36 the newer transactional theorists are far more concerned
with the subsequent bargaining process that takes place among the various
right holders. They recognized that an increasing number of distinct
property rights is problematic as the multiple owner's powers to exclude
contributes to an increased cost in assembling the individual rights into a
single bundle.137 In the words of Richard Posner: " ....having too many sticks
in the bundle of rights that is property increases the costs of transferring
property."138 Parties must overcome rent-seeking, cognitive biases and other
strategic behaviours that generate transaction costs. In particular, they must
overcome the holdup problem, which is the root of the 'tragedy of the
anticommons.139
2.1. The Hold-Up Problem
The hold-up problem refers to the ability of pioneering inventors, who own
broad patents to 'hold-up' the innovation process.l40 Individual owners are
described as having, "set up another tollbooth on the road to product
development"141 increasing the cost and slowing the rate of downstream
innovation. The fragmentation of rights of exclusion among multiple
owners allows the patentees a unique and controlling influence on the
negotiations. Where for example, a party has negotiated access to the
necessary patents, the last patentee can attempt to hold out for an
unreasonable royalty because he or she thinks they can get it from a licensee
that they think will pay almost any price to obtain the last bit of freedom to
136 See Ronald COASE, «The Problem of Social Cosh>, (1960) 3]. L. & Econ. 1; Harold
DEMSETZ, «Toward a Theory of Property Rights», (1967) 57 American Economic Review 347.
137 See R.P. MERGES, op. cit., note 28, p. 127-128.
138 Richard A. POSNER, Economic Analysis ofLaw, 5th ed., New York, Aspen Law & Business,
1998, p. 76.
139 See M.A. HELLER, lac. cit., note 132,674.
140 See Mark A. LEMLEY, «The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law»,
(1997) 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989, 1067.
141 M.A. HELLER and R.S. EISENBERG, lac. cit., note 132, 699.
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operate.142 This patentee effectively has the power to raise prices
umeasonably, requiring the potential licensee to either accept the higher
price or lose the benefit of all previously obtained licenses.l43 Indeed, at the
very least, a patent holder can be expected to engage in monopoly pricing,
which will result in the underproduction of improvements because at
monopoly licensing fees fewer individuals can be expected to purchase the
technology, essential as it may be. l44 One might argue the holdup problem is
lessened if the manufacturer can invent around the patent; however we
must keep in mind that,
"... even a modest "tax" is counterproductive if the patent was improperly
granted, Le., if the patentee did not truly made a new and useful discovery,
or if the patent as granted was too broad, covering some prior art as well as
something truly new. Second, the cumulative effect of many small "taxes"
can become quite large; there are sound reasons to believe that the static
deadweight loss associated with these royalties is increasing and convex in
the tax rate, at least over some range of royalties."145
Naturally, the hold-up problem is the most serious and problematic in
industries where hundreds if not thousands of patents are necessary, such
as the semiconductor or biotechnology indUStry.146 The buildup of first-
142 See F. GRASSLER and M.A. CAPRIA, loco cit., note 17, 112.
143 See Regis C. WORLEY, Jr., «The MPEG LA Patent Pool: A Rule of Reason Analysis and
Suggestion to Improve Procompetitiveness», (2002) 24 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 299,308.
144 See M.A. LEMLEY, loco cit., note 140, 1067. "Blocking patents typically involve the hold
up by a pioneer or improver to mutually beneficial development and cross-licensing." See
Nicholas GROOMBRIDGE and Sheryl CALABRO, «Integra Lifescience v. Merck: Good
Research or Just Good for Research Tool Owners», (2003) 22 Biotechnology Law Reports 462,
470. Authors have also found semiconductor manufacturers enter patent portfolio races
with which to bargain with in order to avoid being held up by other patent holders. See
Bronwyn H. HALL and Rosemarie H. ZIEDONIS, «The Patent Paradox Revisited: An
Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.s. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995», (2001) 32 Rand
Journal ofEconomics 101, 104.
145 C. SHAPIRO, op. cit., note 4, p. 125.
146 These industries are particularly susceptible 'landmining', that is, where an individual
surfaces with a patent for a necessary component or element of the technology (otherwise
known as a 'submarine patent') and demands enormous payments or royalties for use of the
patent, (as was the case of the Lemelson patent for a fax machine) can charge whatever the
market bears, given the royalty set by the pool. This forces investors to either capitulate to
these demands or face the risk that the project, into which considerable funds had already
been invested, may be shut down. This causes both the hold-up and double marginalization
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generation patents presents a serious risk of choking out innovation down
the road.l47
2.2. The Complements Problem
Fragmented property rights generate a further difficulty; namely, the
,complements problem'; originally studied by Cournot in 1838. Shapiro
explains that it was Cournot who discovered that when a manufacturer had
to purchase two key inputs from two different monopolists, the price of the
product produced would be higher (and the profits of producers lower).l48
The proliferation of patent rights leads to a situation where any given future
development depends on obtaining access to a number of different patents
('inputs'), controlled by different patent owners ('monopolists'). This
situation leads to higher prices and more inefficiency than if a single entity
sold both inputs (or made the finished product itself). The same applies -
and is perhaps magnified - in today's high-tech economy. Manufacturers
require the use of an increasing number of different patented technologies
in order to produce the end product, which compounds the complements
problem exponentially, and leads to ever-increasing costs of innovation,
which ultimately stifles the very process itself.
problem. See Michael S. MIRELES, «An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools
and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation», (2004) 38 University of
Michigan Journal ofLaw Refonn 141, 169. See also Sadao NAGAOKA, «Policy Issues in
Efficient Collaboration Through a Patent Pool», in Tzong-Leh HWANG and Chiyuan CHEN
(eds.), The Future Development ofCompetition Framework, The Hague, Kluwer Law
International, 2004, p. 147, at page 150.
147 See Dan 1. BURK and Mark A. LEMLEY, «Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle», (2004)
54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 691, 736. The problem of patents being used to suppress further
innovation and acting as "a clog to our economic machine and a barrier to an economy of
abundance" has long been recognized. See Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.s. 370, 382-383
(1945) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
148 See Augustin COURNOT, Researches into the Mathematical Principles ofthe Theory ofWealth,
trans, by Nathaniel T. Bacon, New York, Macmillan Co., 1929. For a discussion of the
complements problem raised by Cournot see Carl SHAPIRO, «Theories of Oligopoly
Behavior»" in Richard SCHMALENSEE and Robert D. WILLIG (eds.), Handbook ofIndustrial
Organization, New York, Elsevier Science Publishers, 1989, p. 330.
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Where the problem of fragmented intellectual property rights is understood,
those involved have contracted away fragmentation.149 Indeed, Robert
Merges was one of the early commentators suggesting that the presence of
high transaction costs does not halt exchanges but encourages both
producers and users to invest in institutions that lower the cost of certain
types of exchanges.150 Rather than relying on compulsory licensing as a way
to reduce transaction costs, Merges underlined the workability of a number
of formal and informal mechanisms developed by patentees who deal with
each other on a recurring basis in the intellectual property field.151 These
have been very successful in integrating disparate rights and overcoming or
reducing transaction costs as well as solving the complements problem.
Airplanes, automobiles, personal computers, musk film and the Internet
are all examples of industries that avoided the negative effects caused by
the fragmentation of intellectual property rights by designing and
implementing specific licensing arrangements to aggregate their patents
making them available to each member of the pool. In examining these
cases, we find that patent pools emerge to break the "transactional
bottleneck" when firms are engaged in repeated interaction.152
Pools are mechanisms that make possible the exchange of both patented
information and technological know-how153 and assist in overcoming the
149 See Ilkka RAHNASTO, Intellectual Property Rights, External Effects and Anti-Trust Law:
Leveraging IPRs in the Communications Industry, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p.
174.
150 See Robert P. MERGES, «Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property», (1994) 94
Colum. L. Rev. 2655, 2669-2670.
151 Situations where parties will not be engaged in repeated interaction are more susceptible
to the hold-up problem. See, Guido CALABRESI and A. Douglas MELAMED, «Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedra!», (1972) 85 Harv. L. Rev.
1089,1092; Gary D. LlBECAP,
Contracting for Property Rights, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989; Steven N.
WIGGINS and Gary D. LlBECAP, «Oil Field Unitization: Contractual Failure in the Presence
of Imperfect Informatioll», (1985) 75 American Economic Review 368; RP. MERGES, loco cit.,
note 150.
152 See generally, RP. MERGES, loco cit., note 9.
153 See M. BEDNAREK and M. INEICHEN, loco cit., note 110, 3.
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tragedy of the anticommons by facilitating the combination of "farflung
property rights into useable bundles, while preserving the incentives that
come with these rights."I54 Pools bring patentees together to resolve
relational bottlenecks by significantly reducing the transaction costs of
exchanging rights when compared to a series of one-shot licensing deals.
Moreover, "[a]lthough licensing from a pool saves transaction costs, its
main advantage may be in allowing the joint pricing of complementary
pieces of intellectual property... "155
In brief, the fragmentation of intellectual property rights produces, "a
volatile mix of two powerful types of "transaction costs" that can burden
innovation,"156 the hold-up problem and the complements problem. The
increase in fragmented intellectual property rights is a real problem that will
become more pressing as technology evolves. Patent pooling is one means
of "defragmenting" intellectual property rights, by facilitating coordination
among patentees, enabling them to reduce and overcome transaction costs
and implement new technologies.
III. Antitrust Concern with Pools
While patent pooling is a highly efficient means of overcoming the
problems of fragmentation, it raises a number of difficulties at the same
time. These problems largely arise from the concerns of competition law
and policy:
154 RP. MERGES, op. cit., note 28, p. 129. "[Patent pools] are an attractive option for
fragmented patent landscapes ....This issue is especially relevant to the emerging scientific
field of nanotechnology, where there is widespread concern about the fragmentation of the
intellectual property landscape." Alexander LEE, «Examining the Viability of Patent Pools
to the Growing Nanotechnology Patent Thicket», (2006) 3 Nanotechnology Law and Business,
317,317.
155 S. SCOTCHMER, op. cit., note 57, p. 176.
156 C. SHAPIRO, op. cit., note 4, p. 126.
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" ... antitrust sensitivities are invariably heightened when companies in the
same or related lines of business combine their assets, jointly set fees of any
sort, or even talk directly with one another. Because such coordination may
involve the elimination of competition, we have a complex interaction
between private and public interests. Even as coordination between rights
holders is critical, from a public-policy perspective we cannot presume that
private deals are in the public interest. Antitrust authorities will legitimately
want to know whether consumers are helped or harmed by any
arrangement; injured parties may seek redress under the antitrust laws or by
alleging patent misuse."1S7
In other words, there is a risk that patent pools could facilitate
anticompetitive behaviour. Therefore, despite the potential for patent pools
to overcome transaction costs, they raise concern among competition
authorities.
3.1. Cartelization & Collusion
A primary concern about patent pooling is that it can be used to disguise
industry-wide, price-fixing and market share agreements between the
patent holders, effectively providing a legal basis for the formation of
cartels. Patent pools provide a subtle means for enforcing tacit collusive
agreements between rival patent holders. A pool would become an
anticompetitive cartel by including substitute patents rather than
complementary ones, undermining the competition that would have
emerged among the rival firms.l58 The Hartford-Empire case, for example,
exemplifies the situation where patents have been used as a vehicle for
cartel arrangements extending to the whole output of an indUStry.l59
Cartelization has three significant anticompetitive effects; namely, creating
barriers to entry, eliminating competition between rivals and raising prices.
157 Id., p. 126-127.
158 See S. SCOTCHMER, op. cit., note 57, p. 176.
159 See Carl KAYSEN and Donald F. TURNER, Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1965, p. 164.
35
3.1.1. Creating Barriers to Entry
Patent pools could effectively block new entrants to a product market by
preventing access to a patent necessary to produce a particular good or to
conduct R&D. It need not refuse to grant a license to the potential
competitor; simply offering the license on unreasonable terms could deter
competitors. The consequence of accumulating essential patents in a single
entity without providing reasonable access to those patents means that
potential competitors will have to "invent around" the patent in order to
compete in the product market. This effectively distorts competition and can
result in enhanced market power for the pool.l60 While competitors may
well face problems in obtaining licenses to necessary patents for numerous
individual patent holders, consolidating patents in a single entity makes it
far more difficult and complex, because while, " ...individual firms might be
persuaded to license their technologies, firms bound by an agreement not to
license outside the pool will not."161
3.1.2. Eliminating Competition between Rival Patent Holders
Where several patented technologies compete, the royalty rates from
licensing are necessarily lower absent the competition. There are a number
of ways in which these competitors can avoid this problem, all of which
involve some form of collusion. Firms can agree to set an artificially high
royalty rate, but this would be a brazen violation of competition law.
However, with patent pools, the anticompetitive effects are often more
subtle. Patent owners can aggregate their patents in the pool in the name of
overcoming transaction costs, but the patent pool is essentially an
organization that brings horizontal competitors into collusion.162 A pool that
160 See M. WAKUI, op. cit., note 15, p. 88.
161 P.E. AREEDA, H. HOVENKAMP and R. BLAIR, op. cit., note 13, p. 240.
162 See S.c. CARLSON, lac. cit., note 10, 388.
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controls the licensing of the patents and royalty rates could set the price at
the profit maximization level, which is clearly an anticompetitive way to
maintain market power.l63 Even where the pool itself does not control the
licensing of patents, it can serve as an apparatus for coordination between
individual pool members in price setting and leading to tacit exclusion of
third parties (i.e., potential competitors) from the market.
Indeed, it is precisely this concern that led the FTC to attack the Pillar Point
Partners patent pool. The pool - which combined the patented laser eye
surgery techniques of two firms, which were the only two to have received
FDA approval - was believed to be a cover for the firms' collusive
behaviour. The FTC alleged that the pool, established in a duopoly market
structure, enabled Summit Technology and VISX to "raise, fix, stabilize and
maintain the price that physicians must pay to perform [laser eye surgery]
procedures."164 Competition authorities are thus very concerned with the
possibility that patent pools are designed as a shelter for anticompetitive
behaviour.
3.1.3. Raising Prices
Some might suggest that enforcement authorities might prohibit certain
coordinated behaviours that are likely to produce an anticompetitive result.
However, once formed, patent pools enable firms to raise the price of
patented goods that had sold at lower levels prior to formation of the pool,
even without express agreements between members.l65 As Steven Carlson
pointed out
"The establishment of a pool and the prospect of its dissolution create a
mechanism for imposing discipline on members who violate collusive
163 See M. WAKUI, op. cit., note 15, p. 87-88.
164 In re Summit Technology Inc., 127 F.r.c. 208 (1999).
165 See S.c. CARLSON, loco cit., note 10, 395-396.
37
agreements. The assets of each member are held "hostage" by the other
members of the pool, subject to harm if covenants of the pool are breached.
Pool members hold each others' licenses hostage. If the pool is comprised of
blocking patents, then a licensee of any member of the pool can be sued by
all the other members. The members may tacitly agree to maintain prices, to
restrict output, or to divide territories. If one member of the pool licenses a
customer at terms that violate the levels established through the tacit
agreements, then the other members may decide to dissolve the pool and to
sue the breaching member's licensees."166
The patent pool for public key encryption is often cited as an example.
Patent disputes between rival patent holders Cylink and RSA Data Security
lead to the formation of a pool, in the absence of which, access to important
public key encryption technology would have been blocked. Litigation was
avoided with the creation of Public Key Partners (PKP) in 1989, which was
charged with administering the patent rights. For a while, the Cylink-RSA
public key encryption pool defined a de facto proprietary standard.167
The PKP pool eventually dissolved in the wake of various disagreements
between the partners. Following its dissolution, Cylink purportedly
contacted many companies that had licensed toolkits from RSA Data
Security and informed them that they would also need a license for the
Stanford patents held by Cylink. Cylink requested a one-time payment for
the license, which many of RSA's licensees simply paid rather than litigate
the matter in court. Nevertheless, the dispute had a chilling effect on the
industry.
The example of public key encryption shows that patentees stand to lose
substantially from the break-up of patent pools. The RSA algorithm was
becoming the de facto industry standard, but the disruption caused by the
pool's dissolution had a negative impact of the firm's bottom line.
166 Id., 396-397.
167 See Patrick REY and Jean TIROLE, «Financing and Access in Cooperatives», IDEI Working
Papers 404, (May 20, 2007) Institut d' Economie Industrielle, online: <idei.fr/doc/wp/2006/
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Effectively, "[t]he downside risk imposes discipline on patentees to respect
mutual agreements, whatever their nature, and to ensure the long-term
viability of the pool."168 Thus, the effect of the cartel is to raise the cost for
users, who pay more than if the patents were licensed separately,169 while
making it difficult to discontinue the anticompetitive impact.
3.2. Restrictions on Licensee's Competitive Behaviour
Another concern raised by patent pools is the anticompetitive effect of
restrictions imposed on pool members. Pools may require the exclusive use
of licensed technologies by their members or impose anticompetitive tying
arrangements and boycotts of certain products. Pools can also dictate
ancillary license terms that can limit output, area and accompanying
services as well as curtailing R&D.
All these conditions and constraints can result in exclusions and lessen
competition, the more powerful and organized the pool, the easier it is for it
to impose terms and conditions that increase prices or otherwise discourage
competitionpo
An example of a specific pool requirement that can raise prices is a royalty
rebate scheme. Under this type of arrangement, pool members assign their
patents to the pool which in turn licenses the patents back to the pool
members, at a fixed royalty rate. This effectively raises the costs of using the
patents, and thus raises the price of the final product, even though the
scheme has not directly impinged upon the competition between individual
pool members in the product market. What makes royalty rebate schemes
financin~l.pdf>,p. 2, note 3.
168 S.c. CARLSON, loco cit., note 10, 397.
169 See S. SCOTCHMER, op. cit., note 57, p. 176-177.
170 See D.5. TAYLOR, loco cit., note 10; 203.
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particularly insidious is that they concealed in a variety of ways, such as
through equipment sales.l7l Moreover, beyond royalty schemes, there is no
limit on the shape or form these anticompetitive restrictions may take, nor is
there any limit on the number of restrictions that may be imposed.
3.3. Keeping Dubious Patents Intact
One possible adverse effect of patent pooling commonly noted is the fact
that it can facilitate arrangements between pool members that will shelter
invalid patents. These arrangements can take many forms. Pool members
may agree to grant each other immunity from patent infringement suits for
violations by other members in the pool.172 In this case, the pool may be
used to facilitate collusion and disguise a cartel as a lawful patent
monopolyP3 However, such arrangements can also exist informally,
particularly, when pool members face disincentives to challenge the patents
held by other pool members.174 In these cases, particularly in oligopoly
markets, pool members are motivated to settle their patent disputes rather
than risk having their own patents ultimately deemed invalid after
protracted and costly litigation.175 The decision to forego litigation is thus
not a formal, but rather, a tacit one.
171 See S.c. CARLSON, lac. cit., note 10, 396.
172 See DS. TAYLOR, lac. cit., note 10; 202.
173 William M. LANDES and Richard A. POSNER, The Economic Structure ofIntellectual
Property Law, Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 383-384. The
authors cited the case of General Electric as an example of where the licensing arrangements
were utilized to consolidate GE's monopoly on the light bulb market. See United States v.
General Electric Co., 272 US. 476 (1926).
174 See P.E. AREEDA, H. HOVENKAMP and R. BLAIR, op. cit., note 13, p. 235.
175 See S.c. CARLSON, lac. cit., note 10, 386-387. See also, United States v. £.1. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 US. 377, 419-20 (1956). See also United States v. Singer Manufacturing
Company, 374 US. 174, 177 n.2 (1963) (citing internal communications of the sewing machine
manufacturer stating that, as alternative to risky litigation whereby patents may be
invalidated, it would be preferable to pool patents by mutual agreement with rivals).
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In either case, when pool members are unmotivated (or face a disincentive)
to preserve "an open fight over validity,"176 the pool effectively shelters
patents, which would otherwise be determined invalid. Therefore, patent
pools may well contain invalid patents, which generate increased royalties
that licensees are obliged to pay. This is clearly anticompetitive.177 Indeed, at
the end of the nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court stated
clearly: "It is as important to the public that competition should not be
repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really valuable
invention should be protected in his monopoly."178
The problem with patents of dubious validity can be illustrated by looking
at the MPEG patent pool. As Steven Carlson points out, the licensing
administrator does not assess the validity of the patents included in the
pool. Consequently, a patent will only be expelled from the pool where
another pool member declares it invalid, or its invalidity is determined by a
court.179 Given the disincentives discussed above and the fact that it is
precisely the other pool members that are in the best position to determine
whether a patent is valid, it is unlikely that a patent in the pool will be
challenged. By and large, potential entrants to the pool simply cannot, "bear
the cost [of litigation] and only able petitioners are incumbents with
competing technologies."180 There is thus a genuine concern that a patent
pool is likely to shelter unsound patents from adversarial scrutiny, resulting
in parties paying royalty rates in excess of what is competitive.181
176 United States v. Singer Manufacturing Company, cited above, note 175, 199. "Singer and
Gegauf agreed to settle an interference, at least in part, to prevent an open fight over
validity. There is a public interest here which the parties have subordinated to private
ends."
177 See M. WAKUl, op. cit., note 15, p. 88.
178 Pope Manufacturing Company v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892).
179 See MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio License, § 7.6.2 [on file with the author].
180 M. WAKUl, op. cit., note 15, p. 88.
181 See S.c. CARLSON, loco cit., note 10,391-392.
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3.4. Stifling Innovation
Apart from the impact on prices and licensing, there is concern about the
impact of patent pools on innovation.182 To the extent that competition law
seeks to foster innovation while ensuring strong competition, patent pools
present a challenge.
Barton concluded that holders of cross-infringing patents - which are the
type of patents found in patent pools - can reduce the incentive to innovate
by restricting access to the poo1.l83 Two situations in particular curb
incentives to innovate; namely, where the pooling arrangement requires
pool members to pool future patents and where it provides for royalty-free
cross-licensing within the pool. These situations create a disincentive to
innovate because it permits other members to benefit from others
investment in research and development. Because the other firms that are
members can benefit equally with little or no cost to themselves, the
incentive of a pool member to bear the cost of innovation can thus be
diluted as firms 'free ride' on the time and expense furnished by others.l84
Competition authorities are wary of pools, because in their absence, firms
are motivated to pursue research and development in technology that will
give them a competitive advantage over their rivals. Pools that guarantee
access to any patents discovered will clearly dampen any desire to invest in
innovation.185
182 See S. SCOTCHMER, op. cit., note 57, p. 178.
183 See John H. BARTON, «Antitrust Treatment of Oligopolies with Mutually Blocking
Patent Portfolios», (2002) 69 Antitrust L.]. 851,881.
184 See S. SCOTCHMER, op. cit., note 57, p. 178. It should be noted that "[t]he dilution of
incentives was partly muted in the case of the aircraft pool by an innovator's right to
petition a board for compensation. However, the right was seldom exercised." ld. See also
D.5. TAYLOR, lac. cit., note 10; 203.
185 See R. ANDEWELT, lac. cit., note 16, 617.
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3.5. Advantages of Patent Pooling?
Despite the concerns of competition law with patent pooling, it remains a
useful mechanism of overcoming transaction costs that result from
fragmented intellectual property rights. In fact, some believe that pools are,
on balance, pro-competitive.186 For example, aside from overcoming the
complements and hold-up problems, pooling can be useful in reducing
transaction costs, which is beneficial from the point of view of competition
authorities, especially for those seeking to enter the market, who cannot
endure the costs and risks of entry.187
As Areeda and Hovenkamp point out, "[t]he most commonly given
justification of patent pooling is that it permits joint exploitation of an area
of technology without costly individual negotiations for licensing specific
patents or resolving disputes.188 Pooling obviates the need for licensees to
negotiate with each individual patent holder by providing "one-stop
shopping", and is therefore a more cost-effective way in which to secure all
the necessary patent licenses.189
Perhaps more significantly, patent pools are pro-competitive in that they
can help patent holders avoid destructive patent wars that "divert
resources, slow innovation, and limit standardization."19o The advantage of
avoiding costly and time-consuming litigation is clear and has long been
186 See P.E. AREEDA, H. HOVENKAMP and R BLAIR, op. cit., note 13, p. 235.
187 See M. WAKUI, op. cit., note 15, p. 85.
188 See P.E. AREEDA, H. HOVENKAMP and R BLAIR, op. cit., note 13, p. 233.
189 See RC. WORLEY, Jr., loco cit., note 143, 308; F. GRASSLER and M.A. CAPRIA, loco cit.,
note 17, 112; Aaron S. KESSELHEIM and Jerry AVORN, «University-Based Science and
Biotechnology Products: Defining the Boundaries of Intellectual Property», (2005) 293
Journal ofthe American Medical Association, 850, 853.
190 M. BEDNAREK and M. INEICHEN, loco cit., note 110, 3. As one author put it: "Firms
enter in patent pooling arrangements, " ... to avoid the patent landmines that line the path of
innovation." See Michael A. CARRIER, «Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through
Tripartite Innovation», (2003) 56 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1047, 1048.
43
recognized by the courts.191 It has been estimated that billions of dollars a
year have been spent on patent litigation in the United States192 and this
litigation has produced a number of colossal damage awards.193 Even
successful litigation can prove disastrous. Lee de Forest, one of the most
important of the inventors of radio and electronic technology and well
known for his pioneering work with the vacuum tube, was forced into
bankruptcy, despite successful litigation on behalf of his patents.194 In fact,
the elimination "ruinous litigation" was in fact one of aircraft pool's
primary functions195 and there are numerous examples of cases where
patent pools were formed at least partially in response to the cost and
uncertainty of litigating patent claims.
Indeed, because the mere threat of litigation may act as a barrier to entry and
stifle innovation, patent pooling has the additional pro-competitive effect of
supporting the continued existence of smaller firms, who simply could not
afford to stay in business in light of astronomical litigation expense and who
would have otherwise been driven from market by the larger firms.196
Accordingly, because the costs of mutual grants of immunity can be
191 In 1931, the United States Supreme Court stated, " [a]n interchange of patent rights .. .is
frequently necessary if technical advancement is not to be blocked by threatened litigation."
See Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.s. 163,171 (1931). See also, Gilbert
GOLLER, «Competing, Complementary and Blocking Patents: Their Role in Determining
Antitrust Violations in the Areas of Cross-Licensing, Patent Pooling and Package
Licensing», (1968) 50 Journal ofthe Patent Office Society 723, 728.
192 For example, based on historical costs, patent litigation lead to legal expenditures of 1
billion dollars in 1991. See Josh LERNER, «Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors», (1995)
38 J.L. & Econ. 463,470. This does not include the substantial indirect costs of patent
litigation. However, in 2001, Mark Lemley estimated the annual amount spent on patent
litigation at 2.1 billion dollars. See Mark LEMLEY, «Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office»,
(2001) 95 Northwestern University L. Rev. 1495,1502.
193 See S.c. CARLSON, lac. cit., note 10, 380.
194 See G. GOLLER, lac. cit., note 191,728. In 1936 Lee de Forest filed for bankruptcy, listing
liabilities of $400,000 and assets of $390.
195 See S. SCOTCHMER, op. cit., note 57, p. 175-176.
196 See S.c. CARLSON, lac. cit., note 10, 382.
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relatively low, and can significantly reduce litigation costs, they can
generate savings, which in turn can be passed on to consumers.197
Pools also serve as an efficient pricing mechanism for patents whose value
is uncertain. Patents are notoriously difficult assets to price, especially when
the inventions covered are basically far from commercialization and there is
a large information aSYmmetry between the parties. It is the failure of
valuing, or the prospect of it, that blocks implementation accompanied by
the fear of unacceptable royalty rates after implementation. In light of the
impossibility of determining the exact price of each patent, pools aggregate
the patents, set a single price for the package and provide for a formula for
the assessment and division of royalties.198
The efficiencies achieved through the use of patent pooling not only help
value the patents, but also encourage further research and development on
those patents.199 This is because uncertainty about how others will behave
and about the viability of the technology developed, leads to fewer licenses
and less development of existing technologies. Pools provide an incentive to
innovate by creating a mechanism through which parties can share the risks
and benefits of technology ventures. To the extent that pooling permits
achieving efficiencies in the exploitation of a patent and provide more
reliable commitment mechanisms compared with individual licenses, patent
pools can mitigate this tendency to under invest in R&D.200
Finally, patent pools provide, " .. .an institutionalized exchange of technical
information not covered by patents that fosters communication and reduces
197 See R. ANDEWELT, IDe. cit., note 16, 615.
198 See M. WAKUI, op. cit., note IS, p. 86.
199 See R. ANDEWELT,loc. cit., note 16, 616-617.
200 See M. WAKUI, op. cit., note IS, p. 85-86.
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overlap and redundancies in future inventions."201 This increased
communication between firms prevents duplication of efforts through the
exchange of patent licenses and because information that might otherwise
be kept secret is shared among participating firms. 202
IV. The Current Enforcement Approach to Patent
Pooling and its Problems
As we have seen above, patent pools present a number of anticompetitive
and pro-competitive features. This is no doubt complicated by the fact that
the same factual situation can be understood to have different effects. For
example, an agreement between firms not to prosecute each other for patent
violations can either be a form of collusion, designed to facilitate monopoly
power (clearly anticompetitive), or simply as a means of avoiding costly and
time-consuming litigation (pro-competitive). The firms' motivations are not
always readily ascertainable, which complicates the enforcement landscape.
This may explain, in part, why U.S. antitrust scholars have noted enormous
swings in the past decades in the analytical approach used by the courts203
and significant shifts in the attitudes of enforcement agencies with respect to
the interplay between intellectual property and competition law.204
The introduction of the Antitrust IF Guidelines by American antitrust
authorities marked an important shift reflecting the agencies' view that
intellectual property and antitrust laws are actually complementary, both
201 D. LIN, loco cit., note 86, 299-300.
202 See KC. WORLEY, Jr., loco cit., note 143, 309.
203 See Frances MARSHALL, «Patent Pools: Perspectives on Enforcement», in David
BENDER (ed.), Intellectual Property Antitrust 2006, New York, Practising Law Institute, 2006,
p. 367 at page 371.
204 See Alan J. WEINSCHEL, «Antitrust Issues in Licensing Intellectual Property», in David
BENDER (ed.), Intellectual Property Antitrust 2006, New York, Practising Law Institute, 2006,
p. 275 at page 283.
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seeking to improve innovation and enhance competition.205 Under the
Guidelines, aspects of intellectual property licenses once deemed
anticompetitive, are now acknowledged to facilitate the efficient
exploitation of the property.206 The Antitrust IP Guidelines provide that,
"[t]hese arrangements may provide procompetitive benefits by integrating
complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking
positions, and avoiding costly infringement litigation.''207 However, despite
the potential for pro-competitive effects, patent pools, like virtually all
forms of cooperation between competitors, are viewed with distrust by
antitrust enforcement agencies. This is regrettable. As Carl Shapiro
remarked:
"Unfortunately, antitrust enforcement and antitrust law have a deep-rooted
suspicion of cooperative activities involving direct competitors. But such
cooperation, in one form or another, may be precisely what is required to
navigate the patent thicket. As a result, unless antitrust law and enforcement
are quite sensitive to the problems posed by the patent thicket, they can have
the perverse effect of slowing down the commercialization of new
discoveries and ultimately retarding innovation, precisely the opposite of the
intent of both the patent laws and the antitrust laws."2oB
Enforcement agencies have remained somewhat hostile towards patent
pooling following a series of victories in enforcement cases in the 1970s. In
fact, despite recommendations from such bodies as the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) that patent pools could alleviate the
problems of fragmentation,209 persistent fear of antitrust liability presents a
challenge=to those seeking to form a pool, as firms have often encountered
opposition from an enforcement standpoint, notwithstanding the proposed
205 Id., p. 298.
206 See M. Howard MORSE, «Cross-Licensing and Patent Pools: Legal Framework and
Practical Issues», (2002) 3 Antitrust & Intellectual Property 42,42-43.
207 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op. cit., note
125, p. 28. See also, Letter from Joel!. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, United States
Department of Justice, to Gerrard R. Beeney, Oune 26,1997), online: <http://www.usdoj.
gov/atr/ public/busreview/215742.pdf>, p. 2.
208 C. SHAPIRO, op. cit., note 4, p. 122.
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pool's pro-competitive benefits.210 Although the Nine No-No's policy,
which cultivated this hostile environment, was essentially abandoned in the
1990s, in favour of a more economically based approach, there remains
some residual apprehension of pooling arrangements.211 This has had an
adverse effect on pool formation. As Robert Merges commented,
"Patent pools-at least formal ones-are relatively rare in the current
era ... .federal antitrust policy is the most likely explanation for the small
number of patent pools existing today. Ever since myriad forms of inter-firm
cooperation were condemned in the "trust-busting era," firms have been
reluctant to initiate industry-wide arrangements of every ilk, including
pools.... [T]he relative scarcity of pools on the present landscape-especially
given the increasing presence and strength of patents in many industries-
suggests a classic case of excessive deterrence."212
Beyond, this negative bias among enforcement agencies towards patent
pooling, there remains a more fundamental problem with the current
enforcement of pooling. As one commentator noted, the principles
contained in the Guidelines are so broad as to provide little guidance to the
holders of intellectual property wishing to pool their rights. These principles
"can be invoked to justify just about any patent pool or to condemn just
about any patent poo1."213 What the Guidelines lack is a set of specific
methodologies for examining a patent pool in the antitrust context. They
provide no indication as to how we are to investigate the relationship
between patents, nor do they even include an objective methodology for
assessing the existence and density of patent thickets, which is a "logical
direction of inquiry" when we are considering the formation of patent
209 See generally J.CLARK, J.PICCOLO, B. STANTON and K. TYSON, loco cit., note 4.
210 See G. CLARKSON, loco cit., note 8, p. 5-6. See also L.M. GOLDSTEIN and B.N.
KEARSEY, op. cit., note 19, p. 334.
211 For a description of the Nine No-No's see Willard K. TOM and Joshua A. NEWBERG,
«Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to Unified Field», (1997) 66
Antitrust L.J. 167. See also, R. GILBERT and C. SHAPIRO, loco cit., note 100.
212 R.P. MERGES, loco cit., note 9, 1351-1352.
213 Paul H. SAINT-ANTOINE «Is Your Patent Pool Clean?» (1999) 4(1) The Computer Industry
Newsletter 6, 6.
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pOOIS.214 Put quite simply, I/[t]here is insufficient theoretical foundation for
the analysis of anticompetitive patent licensing practices under the IP
Guidelines."215
Nevertheless, in response to requests for guidance from competition
authorities, a set of rules emerged, notably in the form of the DOl's Business
Review Letters. 216 It is widely accepted that these letters are the best
indicators as to how enforcement agencies would apply the Guidelines to a
given pOOP1?
The architects of pools that were vital to the implementation of new
industry standards sought guidance from competition authorities, who in
turn, identified potential problems and set out guiding principles for patent
owners to enable them to decrease their exposure to the scrutiny of, and
prosecution by, antitrust authorities.218 It is fair to say, the prescriptions in
the Business Review Letters crystallized into de facto rules, and
consequently, the formation of patent pools today is driven largely by the
Dars Business Review Letters and FTC enforcement actions.219
Among the practices endorsed by the DOJ and FTC are: limiting pools to
1/essential" patents; non-discriminatory licensing to all interested parties;
214 See G. CLARKSON, loco cit., note 8, p. 22-23.
215 Jonathan D. PUTNAM, «The Regulation of Patent Pools», (Submission to the Antitrust
Division of Department of Justice and the FTC Hearings, Competition and Intellectual Property
Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy, Washington, DC, April 17, 2002) online:
<http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020417jonathanputnam.pdf>. See also, G.
CLARKSON, loco cit., note 8, p. 3.
216 See R. SKITOL and 1. WU, op. cit., note 12, p. 105.
217 See e.g. Marc A. HUBBARD «The FTC Perspective on Patent Pooling», (Paper, State Bar
ofTexas 18th Annual Intellectual Property Law Course, Austin, Texas, March 10-11, 2005),
online: <http://www.munsch.com/pubs/files/1Lhubbard.pdf>. p. 6.
218 See M.B. MORSE, loco cit., note 206, 45. Likewise, Alexander Hadjis pointed out that
"[u]sing the guidelines as a road map, several patent owners formed patent pools." See A.I.
HADJIS, loco cit., note 3.
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permitting licensing outside the pool; avoiding grantback provisions and
ensuring royalties are small relative to the total cost of manufacturing. It
must be pointed out that following these recommendations does not
provide automatic immunity from enforcement agencies' scrutiny, nor does
failure to include these features necessarily elicit an enforcement action.
However, the Business Review Letters provide valuable guidance on the
sorts of licensing provisions that will keep a patent pool"clean"220 and help
it avoid investigation by enforcement agencies.
Thus, it can fairly be said that the modern approach of enforcement agencies
towards patent pools can be gleaned from published guidelines, speeches
and a consideration of the types of cases that have been challenged by
competition authorities. Competition authorities have tried to create a
coherent framework, with a number of principles, or "rules", to guide firms
in forming pools.
However, while establishing clear, firm, rules is generally understood to be
a good thing it may be quite problematic in the context of patent pooling.
This can be more readily understood by closely examining what occurred in
In the Matter of Summit Technology, Inc.221 In that case, Federal Trade
Commission charged Summit and VISX - the only two FDA-approved
manufacturers of lasers used in photo refractive keratectomy ("PRK"), a
vision disorder treatment - with a price-fixing conspiracy.
219 For example, an "ideal patent pooling paradigm" recently suggested essentially included
all the directives from the business review letters. See M. BEDNAREK and M. INEICHEN,
lac. cit., note 110, 4.
220 See P.H. SAINT-ANTOINE, lac. cit., note 213, 8.
221 In re Summit Technology, Inc. & VISX, Inc., No. 9286 (FTC Aug. 21, 1998), online: <http:j /
www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9286/index.htm>.
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The FTC's decision to challenge the arrangement was controversial given
the particular facts of the situation.222 Indeed, it has been suggested that the
reason the MPEG pool survived antitrust scrutiny while the Summit/VISX
pool did not, was because MPEG appears to have specifically crafted their
pooling agreements based on the IP Guidelines in order to avoid antitrust
troubles, whereas"the PRK pool did not have such a roadmap when it was
formed in 1992, three years before release of the IP Guidelines; therefore P3
was not attuned to what turned out to be "hot-button" issues for antitrust
enforcement officials."223 It is therefore unsurprising that voluntary
submission to enforcement agencies for a clearance statement has become
characteristic of recent pools.224 In fact, it appears that current practice
dictates that, "any collective licensing organization, be it a pool or platform,
must obtain clearance letters or alternatively must act in accordance with
the rules defined in prior clearance letters."22s
This is quite problematic for a number of reasons, not the least of which is
the fact that there is some evidence that the Summit/VISX pool case could
have been justified from an antitrust perspective. 226 Joshua A. Newberg, one
222 The Commission maintained that both Summit and VISX originally had developed their
own technology for performing PRK, and had the intellectual property to enter the market
as independent competitors. However, instead of entering the market independently and
competing with each other, they formed the patent pool, Pillar Point Partners, to which each
contributed their respective patents. Rather than compete on price, the two firms agreed to
charge a $ 250 licensing fee that was paid into the pool each time laser eye surgery was
performed using either firm's equipment. The proceeds of the pool were split according to a
formula. For a brief overview of the facts see S.P. ANTHONY, loco cit., note 80, 18-19. See
also W.J. BAER and D.A. BALTO, loco cit., note 82,75-76; and V. Walter BRATIC, David L.
McCOMBS and Shirley WEBSTER, «Taking a New Look at Patent Pools - Use and Abuse»,
(Paper to the Licensing Executives Society, Tools for Licensing in the 21st Century, Phoenix,
Arizona, October 16-19, 2005), p. 5ff.
223 G. CLARKSON, loco cit., note 8, p. 63.
224 See Vianney DEQUlEDT and Bruno VERSAEVEL, «Patent Pools and the Dynamic
Incentives to R&D», Documents De Travail Working Paper No. 07-03, (October 2006), online:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=988303>, p. 2.
225 L.M. GOLDSTEIN and B.N. KEARSEY, op. cit., note 19, p. 78.
226 For instance, Summit and VISX argued, albeit unsuccessfully, that their joint venture
allowed for a procompetitive use of blocking patents. Conversely, the unchallenged
licensing arrangement between Sony, Philips and Pioneer could be classified in a literal
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of the FTC attorneys would later write an article suggesting the
SummitjWISX pool may have been pro-competitive, but by the time article
was published, the damage was done.227 The parties' agreement to abolish
their pool may have served consumers interests in the short-run, but may
well have discouraged a number of holders of complementary patents from
efficient, pro-competitive pooling.228 Equally, if not more important is the
fact that the treatment of the SummitjVISX pool may lead to a situation
where a number of pools adopt the roadmap left by the DOJ business
review letters without due consideration of their particular circumstances.
Principles of seemingly general application cannot be justified in many
cases.
What the Summit Technology case demonstrates is the need for a more
nuanced analysis of patent pools, focusing on the true relationship between
the patents at issue and the parties who control them. As we shall see
below, the competition law treatment of pools is very complex, and it may
well be that "that significant changes in antitrust doctrine and enforcement
policy are needed"229 especially in dealing with high technology and
biotechnology sectors. We will discuss four areas where a clarification and
refinement of policy are necessary; namely, the essentiality doctrine, pool
exclusivity, independent licensing and grantback clauses.
sense as a price-fixing scheme, as it provided for an agreed-upon licensing fee among three
direct competitors./I See P.H. SAINT-ANTOINE, loco cit., note 213, 7.
227 See G. CLARKSON, loco cit., note 8, p. 3-4. The article referred to was J.A. NEWBERG, loco
cit., note 9.
228 See Robert LITAN and Carl SHAPIRO, «Antitrust Policy in the Clinton Administration»,
in Jeffrey A. FRANKEL and Peter ORSAZAG (eds.), American Economic Policy in the 1990s,
Cambridge MIT Press, 2002, p. 435 at page 469.
229 J.A. NEWBERG, loco cit., note 9, 1. See generally, Thomas M. JORDE and David J. TEECE,
Antitrust, Innovation, and Competitiveness, New York, Oxford University Press, 1992.
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4.1 The 'Essentiality' Doctrine
The economic relationship between patents is of the utmost importance in
any competition law analysis of patent pools and assessment of their pro-
competitive or anticompetitive effects.
Patents are typically classified as competing, complementary, blocking, or
unrelated.230 Patents are said to be competing when they present alternate
ways of creating certain products that otherwise would be used in
competition with each other. In this context, the terms competing and
substitute are synonymous. For example, patents A and B respectively, that
cover two different methods of manufacturing widgets, would be said to be
competing or substitutable as either one could be used to produce the same
end result. Conventional economic analysis indicates that competitive
concerns arise with the inclusion of substitute patents in a pool. As Andewelt
explains, the holders of competing or substitute patents should be viewed as
horizontal competitors. Pooling such patents is problematic from an
antitrust point of view because restrictions contained in the pool diminish
the competition that would otherwise exist between these patent owners.231
Inclusion of competing (i.e., non-essential) patents not only reduces market
competition but could also facilitate a price-fixing scheme as well as other
cartel-like activity. Indeed, ever since the Standard Oil case,232 which
involved four firms with substitute patents formed a pool with minimum
230 See R. ANDEWELT,loc. cit., note 16,613; I.A. NEWBERG, lac. cit., note 9, 3.
231 See R. ANDEWELT, lac. cit., note 16, 618.
232 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.s. 163 (1931).
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fees, any pool of substitutable patents is suspected of having
anticompetitive effects.233
Complementary patents, on the other hand, refer to patents over separate
inventions, that may be combined to create a new product, and are not
substitutes for each other.234 Although complementary patents can stand
alone their value often increases when they are combined with other
patented inventions. For example, a patent over a pen cartridge refill is
complementary to the patent over the pen itself.235 There are, however,
some situations where complementary patents are basically useless or of no
value without each other.236 In these situations, the patents are said to be
blocking. The United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property
(IP Guidelines) provides that "an item of intellectual property 'blocks'
another when the second cannot be practiced without using the first."237
Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that these complementary
patents are only blocking in a limited sense because each invention can be
marketed and used individually.238 It is important to realize that
233 See Atsushi KATO, «Patent Pool Enhances Market Competition», (2004) 24 International
Review ofLaw & Economics 255, 257.
234 See M.H. MORSE, lac. cit., note 206, 42.
235 See R. ANDEWELT, lac. cit., note 16, 613.
236 Some authors would suggest that truly complementary patents would be rare, because an
invention that would be of no benefit on its own would not receive a patent grant. See G.
GOLLER, lac. cit., note 191, 725. While this makes sense, one can readily understand that in
the case of an improvement, both the initial invention and the improvement can be worthy
of patents, even though the latter cannot be practiced without the former. Likewise, patents
on a razor shaving handle and on a connecting razor cartridge, while typically used
together, would also deserve individual protection. See M.A. LEMLEY, lac. cit., note 140,
989.
237 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op. cit., note
125, p. 5. As one Quebec author put it, "[u]n brevet de blocage consiste a enregistrer des
brevets sur une invention tres similaire a l'invention d'un competiteur dans Ie but
d'empecher ce dernier d'ameliorer son invention sans entrainer de violation." See Josee
THIBODEAU, «La titrisation de la propriete intellectuelle au Canada», (2003) 48 McGill L.J.
477, 497 n. 98.
238 He stated, "For our purposes, patents on complementary goods owned by different
parties might also be thought to be "blocking" in a limited sense. If I own the patent on a
hammer and you own the patent on an anvil, each of us is free to make our own products,
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competition law still struggles with the concept of a 'blocking patent' due to
an inherent tension between competition (or antitrust) and patent laws. 239
The classic example of blocking patents involved the Wright Brothers, who
received a patent on their flying machine that covered, ailerons, which are
moveable parts of the airplane surface. As mentioned above, an individual
named Curtiss subsequently developed the improvement of the ailerons.
Although the Wright patent prevented Curtiss from using the improved
aileron, Curtiss' patent on the improvement prevented the Wrights from
using it as well. The patents were thus said to be blocking.24o
Both blocking and complementary patents that are owned by separate
companies can create the 'tragedy of the anticommons' because these patent
holders can thwart (or avoid, as the case may be) the creation of new and
useful inventions, leading to a socially sub-optimal, (anticompetitive) result.
Consequently, "[e]conomic theory supports the conclusion that pooling of
two-way blocking patents is procompetitive."241 This is because each
blocking patent is an indispensable element of the invention. By definition,
having "no technical alternative"242 blocking patents are essential patents,
because they do not have substitutes, and therefore the end product could
not be manufactured without them. Indeed, because they are
complementary, not competing assets; pooling blocking patents is more
akin to a merger or joint venture of non-competitors producing
so the patents are not strictly "blocking." M.A. LEMLEY, lac. cit., note 140, 1010, n. 87.Note,
however, improvements are also only partially blocking, because the pioneer inventor is free
to use his or her invention as it was first created (without the improvement).
239 Ian SIMMONS, Patrick LYNCH and Theodore H. FRANK, «"I Know It When I See It":
Defining and Demonstrating "Blocking Patents" », (2002) 16 Antitmst 48,48.
240 See H.A. TOULMIN Jr., lac. cit., note 66, 125. Toulmin explains the stalemate that resulted
between the Curtiss and Wright airplane patents.
241 R.J. GILBERT, lac. cit., note 83, 9.
242 See Ted J. EBERSOLE, Marvin C. GUTHRIE and Jorge A. GOLDSTEIN, «Patent Pools as a
Solution to the Licensing Problems of Diagnostic Genetics», (2005) 17 In tell. Prop. & Tech. L. J.
6,8.
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complementary products than an agreement among competitors.243
Although, as one author has indicated, a royalty-free pooling arrangement
would be ideal, if the patents are truly blocking, any arrangement would be
preferable to a situation where the invention doesn't get produced.
Therefore, regardless of the form this agreement takes, it will necessarily be
more valuable to the end consumer than the results of a failure to
cooperate.244
As a result, enforcement agencies have developed a Doctrine of Essentiality
by which to evaluate which patents ought to be included in a given pool.
The doctrine is employed as a screening mechanism to ascertain which
pools are including substitute (i.e., competing) patents, and are therefore
anticompetitive and which are incorporating blocking or complementary
patents, which do not harm competition. Indeed, "[a] review of the relevant
agency determinations suggests that essentiality is akin to a particularly
expansive form of commercial blocking patent analysis."245
We find, for example, that critical to the agencies' analysis of both the
MPEG-2 pool and the DVD pools was the distinction between essential and
substitute patents.246 The DOJ concluded that combining complementary
intellectual property rights, " ...can be an efficient and procompetitive
method of disseminating those rights to would be users."247 However, it
required independent evaluation of the patents to ensure that only essential
243 See P.E. AREEDA, H. HOVENKAMP and R. BLAIR, op. cit., note 13, p. 233-234. However,
not everyone agrees that such a scenario is beyond the reach of antitrust enforcement. See
Donald TURNER, «Patents, Antitrust and Innovation», (1966) 28 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 151, 157.
244 See C. SHAPIRO, op. cit., note 4, p. 123.
245 Mark D. JANIS, «Aggregation and Dissemination Issues in Patent Pools», University of
Iawa Legal Studies Research Paper, Number 05-14 (April 2005), online: <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=715045>, p. 24. [forthcoming in Wayne Dale COLLINS (ed.), Issues in Competition
Law and Policy, American Bar Association, 2007].
246 Id., p. 24
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patents, not substitutes entered the poo1.248 In the words of the then
Assistant Attorney General, Joel Klein, "[t]he limitation of the Portfolio to
technically essential patents, as opposed to merely advantageous ones,
helps ensure that the Portfolio patents are not competitive with each other
and that the Portfolio license does not, by bundling in non-essential patents,
foreclose the competitive implementation options that the MPEG-2 standard
has expressly left open." 249 This view reflects the principle found in the
Guidelines that: integration of complementary factors of production (e.g.,
patents), is procompetitive while the integration of substitute patents is
anticompetitive. As Carl Shapiro explains,
"The Deparbnent of Justice has clearly articulated its policy towards patent
pools/package licensing in a trio of business review letters regarding an
MPEG patent pool and two DVD patent pools. The essence of this approach,
which precisely mirrors the economic principles articulated above, is that
inclusion of truly complementary patents in a patent pool is desirable and
procompetitive, but assembly of substitute or rival patents in a pool can
eliminate competition and lead to elevated license fees. Put differently, the
key distinction in forming a patent pool is that between "blocking" or
"essential" patents, which properly belong in the pool, and "substitute" or
"rival" patents, which may need to remain separate."250
Prima facie, this seems reasonable; however, the use of the Essentiality
Doctrine is quite problematic. These problems are set out in the sections
below.
247 See e.g., Letter from Joel!. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, United States Department
of Justice, to Gerrard R. Beeney, aune 26, 1997), online: <http://www.usdoj.gov/ atr/
public/busreview/215742.pdf>, p. 10.
248 See S. SCOTCHMER, op. cit., note 57, p. 177. See also, Letter from Joel!. Klein, Assistant
Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, to Gerrard R. Beeney, (December 16,
1998), online: <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.pdf>, p. 10. The
credible, neutral, third-party evaluator is also called an "Evaluation Service Provided" or
"ESP" for short. See L.M. GOLDSTEIN and B.N. KEARSEY, op. cit., note 19, p. 91.
249 Letter from Joel!. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice,
to Gerrard R. Beeney, aune 26,1997), online: <http://www.usdoj.gov/ atr/public/
busreview/215742.pdf>, p. 10. See also, Letter from Joel!. Klein, Assistant Attorney General,
to Garrard R. Beeney (December 16, 1998), online: <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
busreview/2121.htm>.
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4.1.1. Truly Essential Patents
Enforcement agencies often pay scant attention to pools that claim to
incorporate only essential patents, which is problematic for several reasons.
The absence of clear definition and uniformity of application leads patent
holders to overstate the number of essential patents and to judge claims of
essentiality optimistically.251 As a result, patents that are alleged to be
essential can ultimately be proven non-essential, or even completely invalid.
Consider the case of Ericsson and its Swedish parent Telefonaktiebolaget
LM Ericsson, which claimed it held eight patents, essential for making or
using cellular products compliant with 15-95 and other cdmaOne
standards.252 Ericsson initiated litigation against QUALCOMM in Texas;
however, it eventually voluntarily dismissed, with prejudice, all claims
under three of the patents asserted and admitted the invalidity of two
others. All five patents are among the eight patents that, beginning in 1995,
Ericsson had alleged were "essential" to make or use cellular products
compliant with 15-95 and other cdmaOne standards.253
The problem arises in part because neither the DO] or FTC actually directly
examines the characteristics of the chosen patents for validity or tying, but
rather it effectively makes its determination based on the license
administrator's submissions.254 A large problem is that there is asymmetric
information between the parties and the enforcement agencies.255 The patent
250 C. SHAPIRO, op. cit., note 4, p. 134.
251 See L.M. GOLDSTEIN and B.N. KEARSEY, op. cit., note 19, p. 88-89.
252 15-95 (Interim Standard 95), also known as TIA-EIA-95, was the first CDMA-based digital
cellular standard. It was pioneered by Qualcomm. I5-95's brand name is cdmaOne.
253 See QUALCOMM, Press Release, «Ericsson Drops Three "Essential" Patents from
Lawsuit Against QUALCOMM and Surrenders Two Others», (October 28, 1998), online:
<http://www.qualcomm.com/press/releases/1998/press777.htm1>.
254 See J.E. HAAPALA, Jr., loco cit., note 17, 482.
255 The fundamentals of asymmetrical information theory where developed by Nobel
laureate George A. Akerlof. See George A. AKERLOF, «The Market for 'Lemons': Quality,
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism», (1970) 84 Quarterly Journal ofEconomics 488.
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holders are in a far better position to assess whether their patents are
competing or substitutes. They may be well aware that their patents are
non-essential, or they may be simply indifferent to the merits of each other's
claims of essentiality because they are eager to form a profit-maximizing
pool. It is unclear how enforcement agencies should deal with this type of
situation. Some have proposed that we might generate presumptions or
burdens of production or persuasion to alleviate this problem, but they
conclude that, "[t]hese issues may warrant further exploration by scholars
and practitioners." 2S6
Others have suggested that an independent evaluator, present in all DO]
approved pools, will ensure that non-essential patents are not included. In
other words, enforcement agencies can alleviate the information asymmetry
by relying on an independent party whose task it is to acquire the necessary
information about the patents in the pool. As Assistant Attorney General
]oel1. Klein, noted, II [t]he continuing role of an independent expert to assess
essentiality is an especially effective guarantor that the Portfolio patents are
complements, not substitutes."2s7 However, Assistant Attorney General
Klein noted that the "[p]atent-expert mechanism is flawed," due in large
part to the fact that it is the licensors themselves that retain the expert.
Despite concerns over the independence of the experts, he went on to say
that the DO], " .. .is willing to base its enforcement intentions on your
representation that the combination of the Licensors' contractual
commitment to independence and their written assurances to the expert will
256 Willard K. TOM and Joshua A. NEWBERG, «U.s. Enforcement Approaches to the
Antitrust-Intellectual Property Interface», in Robert D. ANDERSON and Nancy T. GALLINI
(eds.), Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-based Economy,
Calgary, University of Calgary Press, 1998, p. 343 at 371.
257 Letter from Joel Klein, Assistant Attorney General, to Garrard R. Beeney Gune 26, 1997),
online: <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/215742.pdf>.p.5.This quote was
cited in a Letter from Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney General, United States
Department of Justice, to Ky P. Ewing, Vinson & Elkins, LLP (Nov. 12, 2002), online:
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/200455.pdf>, p.7 fn 29.
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insulate him from their interests sufficiently to ensure that the Portfolio
Licenses will contain only those patent rights of the Licensors that all DVD-
Video and DVD-ROM licensees will need."258 Note, that the DOJ was
willing to proceed on this basis notwithstanding an earlier admission that
these assurances do not constitute a guarantee. 259 The problems this
generates are self-evident.
4.1.2. Determining 'Essential' Patents
In any case, even independent experts will have difficulty making
determinations of essentiality especially when the number of relevant
patents in the pool becomes quite large. The MPEG LA pool is a good
example. In order to determine whether a patent was essential for the
MPEG-2 standards, MPEG LA proposed to compare every patent against
the 'MPEG specifications', a several thousand page list which outlined
elements absolutely required to practice the standard. Larry Horn (VP of
Licensing with MPEG LA,) described the process as follows: "Very simple.
Simple, but thorough, and not so easy to analyze. The point is that it's
literally running down each independent claim and comparing it with a
thousand or two thousand page stack that is available ....."26o
Although the MPEG LA administration claimed "no assurance is or can be
made that the License includes every essential patent"261 the DOJ
understood that the original twenty-seven patents would constitute "most"
258 Letter from Joel!. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice,
to Gerrard R. Beeney, (December 16, 1998), online: <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
busreview/2121.pdf>, p. 12
259 See Letter from Joel!. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of
Justice, to Gerrard R. Beeney, (December 16, 1998), online: <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/busreview/2121.pdf>, p. 12.
260 Interview of Larry Horn, (March 9, 2004), cited in G. CLARKSON, loco cit., note 8, p. 39.
261 MPEG 2, «FAQ», online: < http://www.mpegla.com/m2/m2-faq.cfm>.
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of the pools of the essential patents.262 Within two years, the number of
patents nearly doubled to 46 with hundreds of foreign patents included as
well. Currently, the MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio License has grown to include
more than 700 patents (134 patent families plus their worldwide
counterparts).263 Over time, patent pools expand, incorporating dozens, if
not hundred, of new patented technologies. Steven Carlson explains the risk
as follows:
"As the patent pool expands, the relation between the patents becomes more
attenuated. The twenty-seven original patents might have been readily
categorized as blocking and/or complementary. The rapid growth of the
pool, however, suggests that patents being incorporated may be blocking or
complementary to certain of the pool's patents, but not blocking or
complementary to the pool as a whole. As the patent pool grows, it runs the
risk of losing cohesion and incorporating patents over products that would
compete with the pooled technologies."264
Consequently, the assessment of complementarities necessary entails an
assessment of patent scope and validity,265 which is no mean task. In other
words, trying to isolate essential patents is not simply difficult because
pools are prone to rapid expansion, but because in pools with thousands of
patents, (such as those found in the semiconductor industry) the
relationship between patents continues to become increasingly complex.266
In our high-tech world, "[t]he relationship that patents bear to each other is
rarely clear. The relationship between patented inventions often includes a
combination of competing, complementary, or blocking characteristics."267
262 See S.c. CARLSON, lac. cit., note 10, 399.
263 MPEG 2, «Introduction», online: <http://www.mpegla.com/m2>.
264 S.c. CARLSON, lac. cit., note 10,390.
265 See R.J. GILBERT, lac. cit., note 83, 25.
266 For example, " [t]he lack of standards and long product development cycles in
biotechnology make it difficult to show that pooled patents are complementary. See P.
GAULE, lac. cit., note 11, 123.
267 See D.5. TAYLOR, lac. cit., note 10; 201-202. See also Ward S. BOWMAN Jr., Patent and
Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1973, p.
202.
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Moreover, the relationship between patents can evolve so that patents that
are currently complements may become substitutes, and vice versa.268
Given the complexity of the interrelationship of patents, it is likely that,
"unlike obscenity, we may not know a blocking patent when we see it."269
Consequently, the effect on competition is not easy to determine as it is
difficult to ascertain whether patents are dearly substitutes or complements,
or whether they have elements of both.27o
Put simply, generally speaking, parties to a pooling arrangement are
competitors, although occasionally, the patents they develop are
complementary, rather than competitive.271 Goller provided the example of
companies A and B, who have created solvents Al and Bl and company C
who discovers that it can create a more effective solvent - Cl - by combining
Al and Bl.272 Al and Bl are not only substitutes (and therefore competing
patents) in the market for solvents, but also 'essential' in relation to Cl. We
must keep in mind that "[i]nnovations are rarely pure substitutes or pure
268 See Philip B. NELSON, «Patent Pools: An Economic Assessment of Current Law and
Policy», (2007) 38 Rutgers L.]. 539, 560. See also, M.D. JANIS, lac. cit., note 245, p. 28. "A
patent accepted in the pool as essential at one time might become arguably non-essential as
a consequence of changes in the marketplace."
269 l. SIMMONS, P. LYNCH and T.H. FRANK, lac. cit., note 239, 48.
270 See R.J. GILBERT, lac. cit., note 83, 25. In discussing the issue of price-fixing in the cross-
licensing and patent pooling context, Goller commented that Justice Douglas, in United
States v. Line Material Co., 332 U.S. 287 (1948), essentially conceded that the case was
indistinguishable from the court's earlier decision in United States v. General Electric
Company, 272 U.S. 476 (1926), yet concurred in the decision (which arrived at a different
result) because he approved of the result of finding a violation since he felt that General
Electric was wrongly decided. See G. GOLLER, lac. cit., note 191, 745.
271 See P.E. AREEDA, H. HOVENKAMP and R. BLAIR, op. cit., note 13, p. 234. As Tom and
Newberg explained, " [i]f the relationship between the parties is clearly complementary or
blocking, then the parties are not in a horizontal relationship and horizontal theories of
harm cannot apply. If the items of intellectual property are clearly substitutes, then
restraints in connection with the pooling arrangement are horizontal and must be looked at
closely. More difficult issues arise in a world of uncertainty or of more complex
relationships that are partly complementary and partly horizontal." See W.K. TOM and J.A.
NEWBERG, op. cit., note 256, p. 371.
272 See G. GOLLER, lac. cit., note 191,726-727.
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complements." 273 As one can well imagine, this clearly complicates the
'essentiality' analysis for enforcement agencies.
The courts have recognized this problem over fifty years ago. In Baker-
Cammack Hosiery Mills v. Davis CO.274 the court observed that stockings were
manufactured using either the Davis or Getaz method. However, some
manufacturers were using aspects of both techniques, which by all accounts,
produced a superior stocking. Accordingly, the Davis and Getaz patents
could be viewed both as competing and complementary. In the Hartford-
Empire pool, which was condemned for containing blocking patents, it
appears that many of the patents covered substitute technologies.275
Likewise, commenting on International Manufacturing Co. v. Landon,276 Mark
Janis noted, " ...viewed solely from a patent law perspective, it is not
accurate to characterize the Pace and Cavenah patents as lying in a
straightforward mutually blocking relationship as would be true of typical
basic and improvement patents. The actual relationship is far more
complex, and perhaps not definable at all in regards to any general
categories. Even this apparently most simple of patent relationships
unravels upon close analysis."277 A more contemporary example is the case
with operating systems and Internet browsers. It had been suggested, that
while Netscape and Windows are not substitutes, given the dynamic nature
of technology, Netscape could one day become middleware that could
replace some operating system functions.278
273 See Fran<;:ois LEVEQUE and Yann MENIERE, The Economics ofPatents and Copyright,
Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004, online: <http://www.bepress.com/leveque>. p. 97.
274 181 F.2d 550 (4th Cir. 1950)
275 See R.J. GILBERT, lac. cit., note 83, 15.
276 336 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1964). The patents in questioned related to two pool filter and
skimmer systems, one of which could also operate as a pool vacuum.
277 M.D. JANIS, lac. cit., note 245, p. 18. Note however that the 9th Circuit court found the
patents to be blocking.
278 See F. LEVEQUE and Y. MENIERE, op. cit., note 273, p. 97.
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The situation can become even more complicated with increasingly
sophisticated patents. Masako Wakui presents the following umesolved
problem:
"Which patent should be pooled when the result S can be attained with a
patent combination of either A + B +X, A + B + Y? Neither X nor Y should be
pooled because they have alternatives? Then how about when X is highly
necessary for a majority of it to be compatible with their installed
technology? In this situation, considering economising the transaction cost, is
the pool of A + B + X allowed? In such an arrangement, not only Y but also
the consumer may suffer if Y has potential to grow popular. Organising a
separate pool, A + B + X and A + B + Y may be the solution, but it is not
always possible and sometimes ineffective because they have a common
element A + B. Rigid separation increases the establishment cost, which may
make a second pool impossible, The problem involves the trade-off between
competition and efficiency through the cutting of transaction costS."279
The problem can also arise in the inverse manner. What happens when two
or more patents can be replaced by a single one? For example, using the
illustration provided above, assume a given product requires four patents:
A+B+X+Y = S. Imagine that patents A+B could be replaced by Z. The
product S can then be created by combining X+Y+Z, reducing the required
number of patents from four to three. This scenario, while perfectly
plausible, has not been addressed by antitrust authorities.280 It appears that
under the MPEG LA agreement A and B would have to be removed from
the pool, and if the inventor of Z was a non-member licensee of the pool, the
grantback provision would require him or her to license Z to member
licensors. Beyond this, there is no clear guidance from enforcement
authorities.281 If the enforcement focus is on ensuring that no substitute
279 M. WAKUI, op. cit., note IS, p. 104.
280 See R.c. WORLEY, Jr., loco cit., note 143, 313.
281 The question arises as to whether A and B would be compensated from the pool. Suzanne
Scotchmer noted that, "[s]uch compensation would reduce the incentive for other pool
members to embrace a new technology, and thus reduce the incentive for the nonmember to
invest." See S. SCOTHCHMER, op. cit., note 57, p. 178. This was what occurred in the radio
industry after the RCA was formed. In Margaret Graham's view, the RCA used package
licenses coupled with high royalties to maintain its dominant position. Graham describes
RCA's use of package licensing to dominate the radio industry from the 1920s until the
64
patents are in the pool then the introduction of patent Z would necessarily
force the initial essential patents A and B out of the poo1.282 Removing A and
B from the pool without replacing them with Z will produce
anticompetitive results for consumers because Z is likely to be more cost-
effective than using A and B. Consequently, the holder of patent Z can
demand a licensing fee just below the total costs associated with the
alternative process, which will raise licensing costs and ultimately the price
consumers must pay for the product.283
One could imagine that enforcement agencies would like to see Z replace A
and B in the pool, which would lead to the most pro-competitive solution.284
However, precisely because it is more efficient, Z has an incentive to "hold-
out" and refrain from joining the pool and charge a higher royalty rate than
it would receive as a member. Coumot's theorem is relevant here, because
leaving out essential patents from the pool contributes to the "double
marginalization" problem that pooling is intended to overcome. Staying out
of the pools has the effect of both reducing the demand for the patents in the
antitrust enforcement actions of 1958: "Perhaps the most important enduring consequence
of the policy was that it made it uneconomic for most other companies to do radio-related
research, because they could not recoup their investment." See Margaret B.W. GRAHAM,
RCA and the VideoDisc: The Business ofResearch, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1986, p. 41. However, the net effect is ambiguous. The bulk of Graham's account supports
the view that under the management of commercial radio pioneer David Sarnoff, the central
mission of the RCA itself was to improve their technologies. See generally Leon
GUTTERMAN (ed.), The Wisdom ofSarnoffand the World ofRCA. Beverly Hills, The Wisdom
Society for the Advancement of Knowledge, Learning, and Research in Education, 1967.
282 One author has pointed out, "[i]n addition, a patent pool for a single standard may split,
so that a licensee has to obtain licenses separately from two or more group of the patentees.
In the case of the DVD patent pool, a firm has to get at least two independent licenses from
3C group and from 6C group." See S. NAGAOKA, op. cit., note 146, p. 150. Currently, in
modern video coding standard and H.264/AVC technology there are two patent pools: One
is organized by MPEG LA and the other by Via Licensing. The pools are not precisely the
same, so that end users need to have a license from both patent pools. Moreover, these pools
do not guarantee that they cover the entire technology of H.264, given that as participation
in the pool is voluntary. See Jam OSTERMAN, Jan BORMANS, Peter LIST, Detlev MARPE,
Matthias NARROSCHKE, Fernando PEREIRA, Thomas STOCKHAMMER, and Thomas
WEDl, «Video coding with H.264/AVC: Tools, Performance, and Complexity», (2004) 4
IEEE Circuits and Systems Magazine 7, 25.
283 See R.c. WORLEY, Jr., loco cit., note 143, 317.
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pool and reducing joint profit. Nevertheless, "defection from the patent pool
is the best unilateral choice for a firm with an essential patent in the short-
"285run....
Of course, another possibility would be to fashion an agreement that would
permit patents A and B to remain in the pool in this type of situation.
However, this would mean that Z could not be included if one takes
seriously the doctrine of 'essentiality'. This would be detrimental to the
ultimate consumer, who would face a higher priced end product due to
inefficiency.286
4.1.3. 'Essential' Substitutes
Although competition law scholars have noted that pooling competing (i.e.,
substitute) patents does not always eliminate competition,287 the doctrine of
essentiality faces a serious challenge in the biotechnology sector and similar
industries. Consider the situation when we speak of creating a biological
research tool patent pool.
Some have argued that patent pools are less likely to arise in the
biotechnology industry because of the great number of heterogeneous
parties with contradictory interests that would have to come to an
agreement.288 However, a more serious challenge arises from the
evolutionary nature of biology, which" ... precludes any practical definition
284 ld., 313-314.
285 S. NAGAOKA, op. cit., note 146, p. 151. Note that the incentive exists, but may not be as
great as in other cases. Recall that Z's leverage weakened because patents A and B continue
to be alternatives. However, because it is more efficient, it can raise the price to the point
that it is no longer cost-effective to use Z. This still creates some inefficiency.
286 See R.C. WORLEY, Jr., lac. cit., note 143, 316-317.
287 See R. ANDEWELT, lac. cit., note 16, 623-624.
288 See generally Arti K. RAI, <<Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing
New Technology», (1999) 34 Wake Forest 1. Rev. 827.
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of "standardized specifications." Thus, there is simply no mechanism by
which essential patents can be readily identified to limit pool composition."
289 As Scott Iyama explains,
"The evolution of biomedical products creates an inherent, and very
significant, distinguishing characteristic of the research tool pool. Namely, as
biological research tools are required for and utilized in a diverse array of
processes, procedures, and therapies, there is no standardized end
product."29o
In contrast with DVD players or MPEG video, there is no single
downstream application for the patent rights contained in a research tool
pool, which are required for and utilized in a diverse array of processes,
procedures, and therapies.291 For a research tool patent pool to have any
reasonable demand and functionality, it must be composed of all possible
research tools. As a result, the patent pool is necessarily composed of
possible substitutes. Therefore, one could not create a research tool patent
pool that will be truly functional and would receive antitrust approval
under the 'essentiality' criterion.
4.1.4. Pro-competitive Substitutes
To this point, we have seen the difficulties of applying the 'essentiality'
doctrine in a given situation. However, recent economic analysis reveals
that contrary to our initial hypothesis, and contrary to the Department of
Justice's and the Federal Trade Commission's views,292 pooling substitute
289 Scott IYAMA, «The USPTO's Proposal of a Biological Research Tool Patent Pool Doesn't
Hold Water», (2005) 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1223, 1239.
290 ld.
291 ld.
292 Arrangements where substitute patents are pooled have been considered anticompetitive
conduct by the DOJ and FTC. The FTC's opinion is clear from its enforcement action in the
Summit and VISX case: A pool of substitute patents will be suspected as a price-fixing
scheme and a restraint on licensing competition.
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patents can actually improve social welfare and are therefore pro-competitive,
in certain situations.293
Atsushi Kato explained this paradoxical result is possible because patent
holders determine both the licensing fees they wish to charge and the
number of licenses they will grant. Consequently,
"If a pool of substitute patents is prohibited, two licensors compete in
licensing fees which may result in a lower number of licensed firms in
equilibrium. If it is permitted, no competition occurs in the licensing market
and licensing fees remain high, which induces licensors to license a greater
number of firms. Since a licensing fee is just a transfer within the economy,
this does not affect social welfare. Only the number of firms that are able to
use a low marginal cost technology does. Therefore, higher social welfare
could be obtained when a patent pool is permitted."294
It is noteworthy that pooling substitute patents can also be socially
beneficial from the perspective of dynamic efficiency as well. Collusion
stimulates investment in second-generation inventions, which is socially
beneficial when the social benefits exceed private returns. Vincenzo
Denicola has suggested a more lenient treatment of pools where innovation
is cumulative, because there may in fact be a dynamic-efficiency defense in
that case.295 He modeled several scenarios where this might arise:
"In the Stackelberg equilibrium, permitting collusion is optimal if the non-
appropriable value of the second innovation is difficult to achieve or the first
is easy. In the simultaneous-move model the welfare comparison is more
complicated, but it may still be optimal to permit collusion in certain
circumstances."296
293 See A. KATO,loc. cit., note 233.
294 ld., 266.
295 Vincenzo DENICOLO, «Sequential Innovation and the Patent-Antitrust Conflicb>, (2002)
54 Oxford Economic Papers 649, 665. The author does however caution against drawing
practical implications from the analysis given the fact that the conclusions are sensitive to
certain critical assumptions and the informational constraints faced by enforcement
agencies.
296 ld.
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We see then that the inclusion of substitute patents in a pool does not
always generate anticompetitive effects, and indeed, pooling substitute
patents may be socially beneficial in some circumstances.297
What has emerged in the above discussion is that although the essentiality
doctrine can serve a useful purpose, given the increasing fragmentation of
IP, the corresponding growth in pool size and the growing complexity of
the relationship between patents, the essentiality analysis is a highly
imperfect screening mechanism. As Mark Janis concluded, " ... the
"essentiality" criterion for determining which patents may be contributed to
a patent pool is not a good candidate for building regulatory certainty. It is
exceedingly complex, and policymakers should be wary of its increasingly
dominant role in the antitrust analysis of patent pools."298 A more flexible
approach to enforcement is necessary. However, the essentiality doctrine is
not the only area of competition policy that requires refinement. These other
issues are examined below.
4.2. Independent Licensing and Refusals to Deal in Patent
Pools
Pools that received DOJ approval since the Antitrust IP Guidelines were
developed have contained provisions requiring licensors to make available
297 Several authors believe that that the Federal Circuit's decision in U.S. Philips Corporation
v. International Trade Commission, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005), suggests, " that patent pool
administrators need not be as concerned as they were in the past about excluding non-
essential patents from package licensing arrangements....While Philips should not be read
to broadly approve of the intentional inclusion of non-essential patents in portfolios offered
only as a package, the case is nonetheless likely to be widely cited as a defense, at least for
an accidental or incidental inclusion of such patents." See Daniel P. HOMILLER, «Patent
Misuse in Patent Pool Licensing: From National Harrow to "the Nine No-Nos" to Not
LikelY'>' (2006) Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 0007, online: <http://www.Iaw.duke.edu/journals/
dltr/articles/pdf/2006dltr0007.pdf>, para. 40. See also P.B. NELSON, loco cit., note 268, 569.
298 M.D. JANIS, loco cit., note 245, p. 2.
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their essential patents to interested third parties.299 As a result, patent
owners who seek approval from antitrust enforcement authorities with
respect to a proposed pool will probably include a provision that requires
pool members to license their patents to third parties. It is perhaps not
surprising that patent pools require their members to license patented
technology to non-members. Indeed, in the past, restrictions on licensing to
third-parties has invited scrutiny by enforcement authorities,3°o because it is
believed that such clauses will reduce the anticompetitive effect of a pool.301
As far back as the 1940s, the United States Supreme Court began to mandate
compulsory licenses with reasonable royalties, rather than order the
dissolution of suspicious pools.302 Several of these decisions have made
much of the fact that the companies involved - while pooling or cross-
licensing among each other freely - agreed not to license outsiders at all or
only upon consent of the other pool participants.
For example, in Hartford-Empire v. United States 303 the Court found that the
appellants used cooperative arrangements to suppress competition in the
use of glassmaking machinery. As part of the remedy, the Court compelled
the companies to license their patents without discrimination or restriction
at standard royalty rates. Likewise, in Besser Manufacturing Co. v. United
299 See e.g., Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, United States Department
of Justice, to Gerrard R. Beeney, (December 16, 1998), online: <http://www.usdoj.govlatrl
public/busreview/2121.pdf>, p. 5-6. Sony and Pioneer granted Philips a nonexclusive
license, the terms of which require Philips to grant licenses on essential patents
"nondiscriminatorally to all interested third parties." See also, Letter from Charles A. James,
Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, to Ky P. Ewing, Vinson &
Elkins, LLP (Nov. 12, 2002), online: <http://www.usdoj.gov1atr Ipublic/busreview1200455
.pdf>, p. 15
300 See G. CLARKSON, lac. cit., note 8, p. 8.
301 As FTC Commissioner Sheila Anthony stated: "Licensing agreements can be written to
include particular features that increase the likelihood of procompetitive results and,
therefore, are less apt to raise antitrust concerns. For example, make the license non-
exclusive--Le., make patents available to others who are not parties to the arrangement....."
S.F. ANTHONY, lac. cit., note 80, 37.
302 See R. ANDEWELT, lac. cit., note 16,636; F.L. VAUGHAN, op. cit., note 21, p. 78.
303 323 U.s. 386, 406 (1945).
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States, 304 the Court ultimately approved the district court's judgment
reqUlrmg the pool to license all third parties on payment of a "fair"
royalty.30s In Canada, the legislation permits the Commissioner of Patents to
order the grant of a license in certain circumstances.306 Such compulsory
licenses have formed the basis of the non-discrimination and reasonable
royalty provisions seen in the agreements of modern patent pool
structures.307 Given the prospect of compulsory licensing, it is
understandable pools are structured to require licensing to third parties and
avoid being force to on terms they may not like.
These compulsory licensing clauses have not elicited much reaction from
enforcement authorities in their review of prospective patent pooling
agreements. Indeed, the silence on the part of competition authorities
suggests a tacit acknowledgment that the obligation to license to third
parties is an indispensable characteristic of acceptable patent pools.
However, Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole question whether these clauses are
absolutely necessary or simply a simple and trouble-free means of placating
the apprehension of enforcement authorities.308
On the one hand, mandatory independent licensing in pools seems
appropriate, as parties may not, in any case, refuse to license patents to
certain individuals for anticompetitive reasons. The use of monopoly
power, even when gained through legal means such as a patent, may not be
used "to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to
304 343 U.s. 444 (1952).
305 See P.E. AREEDA, H. HOVENKAMP and R. BLAIR, op. cit., note 13, p. 242.
306 See Patent Act, RS. (1985), c. P-4, ss. 65,66. The Act permits the Commissioner to order a
compulsory license where there has been an abuse of the exclusive rights granted under the
Act. It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the U.S., it is the intellectual property
legislation (i.e., the Patent Act) that provides for the compulsory licensing. In the United
States, these licenses have been ordered from the perspective of antitrust law, rather than IP
legislation.
307 See D. LIN, lac. cit., note 86, 300.
308 See J. LERNER and J. TIROLE, lac. cit., note 116, 692.
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destroy a competitor."309 In Canada, the Competition Bureau will intervene
when the alleged anticompetitive harm results from arrangements itself, not
simply the mere exercise of the intellectual property rights. 310
On the other hand, however, this is inconsistent with the fact that, "[a]s a
general rule, the owner of a patent may license to whomever he or she
wants, or simply refuse to license at all.... The terms of the contract are a
matter of private negotiation and are of no concern to the public...." 311 In
fact, leading antitrust scholars have declared it perfectly acceptable for
rivals with complementary patents to decline to license to each other and to
deny their licensees the right to sublicense. 312
Prima facie, it may seem difficult to reconcile these two lines.313 But closer
consideration ought to lead to us to the view that, limitations on access to
patents within a pool should not be viewed as especially suspect especially,
when we accept as a fundamental feature of patent pools that only essential
patents will be included. Where this is the case, "no licensee could compete
without a license from all those who own complementary intellectual
309 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948); see also United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,401 (1948) (holding that "the rewards which flow to the patentee
and his licensees from the suppression of competition through the regulation of an industry
are not reasonably and normally adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the patentee's
monopoly").
310 See Alain BOURASSA, «Patent Pooling Arrangements and the Competition Act», Ottawa
Business Journal, (October 17, 2004), online: <http://www.ottawabusinessjournal.com/
290668719889416.php>.
311 D.S. TAYLOR, lac. cit., note 10; 205.
312 "Thus, assume that Firms A and B are large rivals in a market, and have developed
complementary process patents. Firm A owns a process patent to A', and firm B owns a
process patent to B'. Neither firm has an obligation under either the patent or antitrust laws
to license the other or anyone else. Further, A can license A' to B, denying B the right to
sublicense A' to others; and vice versa. And indeed, A can also as a general matter issue B a
license to A', promising B that it will not license A' to others." See P.E. AREEDA, H.
HOVENKAMP and R. BLAIR, op. cit., note 13, p. 237-238.
313As Douglas Melamed has pointed out, "[t]he law has struggled uneasily with exclusion
cases because it has not yet embraced a conceptual framework for dealing with these
competing considerations. See A. Douglas MELAMED, «Exclusionary Conduct Under the
Antitrust Laws: Balancing, Sacrifice, and Refusals to Dea1», (2005) 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1247,
1250-1251.
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property rights. Therefore, an agreement to impose licensing restrictions
would not harm competition that would have occurred in the absence of the
license."314 Andewelt explained it as follows:
" ... exclusion of competitors from access to technology is at the very heart of
the patent system and continued exclusion can be a rational and
economically beneficial way of exploiting the patent grant. Moreover, in any
event, the antitrust laws do not oblige parties to license their pooled patents
in a manner than promotes competition; their obligation simply is not to
engage in anti-competitive behavior. To the extent that the pool does not
impair competition in the patent licensing market or in downstream markets,
the pool is lawful. Absent such anticompetitive effects, a party that wants
access to valuable patents in a pool should not be able to use suit under the
antitrust laws to secure it."315
In other words, the mere existence of monopoly power is not an offence.316
Even where arrangements involve exclusivity, they are unlikely, without
more, to violate the antitrust laws.317
In the Tele-Direct case, the Canadian Competition Tribunal stated that,
" ... something more than the mere exercise of statutory rights, even if
exclusionary in effect, must be present before there can be a finding of
misuse of a trade-mark." 318 In United States v. Colgate & Co., the Supreme
Court held that "in the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a
monopoly, the Sherman Act does not restrict the long recognized right of a
patent holder ... to freely exercise independent discretion as to the parties
with whom he will deal (emphasis added)."319 It is not monopoly power in
314 R.J. GILBERT, loco cit., note 83, 26.
315 R. ANDEWELT, loco cit., note 16, 632.
316 COMPETITION BUREAU, Enforcement Guidelines for the Abuse ofDominance Provisions,
Hull, The Bureau, 2001, online: <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/ct/aod.pdf>, p. 5-6.
317 See Boston Scientific Corp. V. Schneider A.G., 983 F. Supp. 245 (D. Mass. 1997). "Indeed, in
virtually all the decisions said to condemn patent pools, it is not the mere "pooling" or
sharing that is found offensive, but rather the price or quality restriction, market division, or
similarly anticompetitive restraint that is attached." P.E. AREEDA, H. HOVENKAMP and
R. BLAIR,op. cit., note 13, p. 237.
318 Canada (Director ofInvestigation and Research) V. Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc. (1997),73
c.P.R. (3d) 1 (Comp. Trib.), p. 30.
319 United States v. Colgate, 250 U.s. 300,307 (1919). Note, however, that, "Colgate's "freedom
formulation" is the "baseline norm" that continues to be cited with "programmed repetition.
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itself, but going beyond legitimate competitive behaviour to entrench
monopoly power that is condemned.32o
The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Trink0321
may offer further support for this position. Commentators have pointed out
that this case stands for the undeniable proposition that the antitrust laws
do not - without more - require that a court carve out elements of a
monopolist's private, productive infrastructure and compel the monopolist
to sell them as inputs at regulated prices to the monopolist's rivals.322 This
decision would likely also dampen the possibility of invoking the essential
facilities doctrine to compel pool members to license their patents. Refusals
to deal cases involving intellectual property can resemble essential facilities
type cases,323 because they involve control of an 'essential facility' (i.e., the
patent) that one party ('the pool') may deny to others. Nevertheless, as in
The norm itself remains unexplained; it is just one of those original principles that is
grounded only on itself." See Glen O. ROBINSON, «On Refusing to Deal With Rivals»,
(2001) 87 Cornell L. Rev. 1177, 1190.
320 See M. TREBILCOCK, RA. WINTER, P. COLLINS and E.M. IACOBUCCI, op. cit., note
121, p. 507. To put it differently, it is the abuse of dominance, not simply dominance, that is
prohibited. See Patent Act, RS. 1985, c. P-4, ss. 78,79.
321 Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Trinka, 540 U.s. 398 (2004).
322 See John THOME, «A Categorical Rule Limiting Section 2 of the Sherman Act Verizon v
Trinka», (2005) 72 University ofChicago L. Rev. 289. However, the decision should be read
with caution. It has been noted that, " [t]he Trinka decision inspires over-interpretation. A
maximal view of Trinka holds that the Court eliminated refusals to deal (or nearly
did) ....The Working Group does not believe that any such broad reading of Trinka is either
warranted or reasonable. The Court clearly refrained from a) overruling either Otter Tailor
Aspen Skiing (albeit placing the latter case near the"outer boundary of Section 2"), b)
requiring a prior course of dealing as a condition to an unlawful refusal to deal, c)
repudiating the essential facilities doctrine, or d) making any change in the doctrine of
monopoly leveraging, which continues to be governed as any other attempted
monopolization claim by the rule in Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan." See AMERICAN
ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, «Comments of the American Antitrust Institute Working Group
on Exclusionary Conduct», (Comments presented before the U. S. Antitrust Modernization
Commission, July 15, 2005), online: <http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/437.pdf >,
p.18-19.
323 See B.A. FACEY and D.H. ASAF, op. cit., note 128, p. 340.
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Trinka, the courts are increasingly showing a reluctance to impose such
duties on firms.324
A patent pool that chooses to limit its licenses to members of the pool and
not to license to third parties is said to be limiting competition as compared
to a situation where third parties receive licenses. The presumption is that
more parties with access to essential patents will mean more potential
competitors in the downstream market. This makes sense. However, in a
patent pool of essential patents we must consider what would happen if the
patent holders did not combine their patents. In that scenario, where the
patents holders fail to cooperate, the product would never come into
existence since, as Carl Shapiro pointed out, none of the firms will be able to
manufacture the product without infringing each other's patents.325 In other
words, "the relevant market is not the market for an individual technology
but the market for the package of licenses..." 326 Although he explains a
license that would permit others access to these patents would be ideal, any
324 See Eleanor M. FOX, «A Tale of Two Jurisdictions and an Orphan Case: Antitrust,
Intellectual Property, and Refusals to Deal», (2005) 28 Fordham Int'l L.J. 952,965. The
situation in Canada is somewhat less clear. There is nothing explicit on this in the
Competition Act, and there has been no consideration of the essential facilities doctrine in
the context of patents or other intellectual property in Canadian jurisprudence. However, in
Canada (Director ofInvestigation and Research) v. D & B Companies ofCanada Ltd., (1995),64
c.P.R. (3d) 216 (Comp. Trib.), the Tribunal ordered Nielsen Marketing Research to provide
potential competitors with certain data because it was"essential to restore competition in
the market." See Richard F.D. CORLEY, Navin JONEJA and Prakash NARAYANAN,
«Present Concerns and Future Challenges Facing Industry Canada», (Report, The
Competition / Intellectual Property Interface-Present Concerns And Future Challenges,
Competition Bureau, March 2006), online:
<http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/intemet/index.cfm/http:/www.competitionburea
u.gc.ca/pdfs/index.cfm?itemID=2285&lg=e>. For a critical assessment of the doctrine, see
Phillip AREEDA, «Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles», (1990) 58
Antitrust L.J. 84l.
325 What Carl Shapiro actually said was: "If two patent holders are the only companies
realistically capable of manufacturing products that utilize their intellectual property rights,
a royalty-free cross license is ideal from the point of view of competition. But any cross license
is superior to a world in which the patents holders fail to cooperate, since neither could
proceed with actual production and sale in that world without infringing on the other's
patents." C. SHAPIRO, op. cit., note 4, p. 123.
326 Robin FELDMAN, «The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is It Patent Misuse?»,
(2004) 6 Minnesota Journal ofLaw, Science & Technology 117,167.
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arrangement would be superior to a situation in which the parties did not
cooperate to create the end product.327
Therefore, because an agreement between essential patent holders is pro-
competitive; regardless of the restrictions they might impose (compared to a
world in which the parties did not pool their patents), antitrust scholars
maintain that, " ... .firms that have been active in developing a common
technology should generally be permitted to share it with one another while
denying it to others so long as the arrangement does not produce significant
anticompetitive effects in a properly defined relevant market."328 Where
firms pool their patents to create a "common technology", competition
authorities ought to consider that the pool's decision not to license is more
closely analogous to a situation where co-owners of a single patent agree
not to license their patent, rather than the anticompetitive exercise of a
monopoly.
The real questions enforcement authorities must ask, when confronted with
compulsory licensing clauses in patent pools, are, " ....what is the cost for
pool members of including this provision.....? Second, would it be optimal
for antitrust authorities to insist on this provision?"329 Some might argue
that although compelling pools to offer licenses to third parties is not
absolutely necessary but can provide additional assurance that there is no
anticompetitive animus underlying the pool formation. In this view,
compulsory independent licensing is unnecessary but innocuous. This,
however, is not necessarily the case. The primary difficulty with
327 However, one could imagine an approach which asks not, whether there would be less
competition would occur without that agreement, but rather whether the /I ....agreement is
the least restrictive alternative that is workable in the sense of solving the legitimate business
problem faced./I This is a much tougher standard to meet, but not the one advocated in the
Antitrust IP Guidelines or by enforcement authorities. See C. SHAPIRO, op. cit., note 4, p.
129.
328 P.E. AREEDA, H. HOVENKAMP and R. BLAIR, op. cit., note 13, p. 240-241.
329 J. LERNER and J. TIROLE, lac. cit., note 116, 698.
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compulsory licensing in this case is that it creates a significant free rider
problem330 by creating a disincentive to innovate, as firms are, in any case,
guaranteed access to any innovations. The fact that pool administrators
might require independent licensing, believing that it is effectively
obligatory if it is to survive scrutiny by enforcement authorities, is
problematic. The mere fact that members of the pool choose not to license to
any outside parties is not anticompetitive by itself. What ought to attract
scrutiny is a decision on the part of the pool administration to license certain
third parties and not others. In that case the licensing becomes
discriminatory and an anticompetitive practice. Remember, the gravamen of
the offense is not the "pooling," per se, but rather cementing market power
and deterring entry without producing significant procompetitive benefits;
however, a pool of essential patents doesn't entrench market power, it
creates the market itself, because absent the pool, the product in question
would not exist.
4.3 Non-Exclusive ('Open') Pools
The formation of patent pools can be understood in economic terms as
either an open or closed membership game.331 Where membership is open,
every party may join the pool without any veto by other parties whereas a
veto is mandated in closed membership games.332 In other words, in an
330 See P.E. AREEDA, H. HOVENKAMP and R. BLAIR, op. cit., note 13, p. 240-241.
331 The early literature on coalition formation studied open membership games. See
Reinhard SELTEN, «A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition When 4 are Few and 6 are
Many», (1973) 2 International Journal ofGame Theory 141; Claude D'ASPERMONT, Alexis
JACQUEMIN, Jean J. GABSZEWICZ and John A. WEYMARK «On the Stability of Collusive
Price Leadership», (1983) 16 Canadian Journal ofEconomics 17. A number of studies that
followed examined closed membership games, beginning with Hart and Kurz. See Sergiu
HART and Mordecai KURZ, «Endogenous Formation of Coalitions», (1983) 51 Econometrica
1047.
332 Exclusionary membership was studied in the context of Cournot competition by Kamien
and Zang and for the formation of efficiency enhancing and research joint ventures by Yi
and Shin. See Morton 1. KAMIEN and Israel ZANG, «Monopolization by Sequential
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open membership game, membership is non-exclusive; conversely,
membership is exclusive in a closed membership game.
A casual survey of recent patent pools revealed that many pools are
structured with open entry, which some have suggested is due to
competition concerns.333 For example, authors have pointed to the MPEG
LA and 3G patent pools as organizations that were deliberately designed
with non-exclusive membership to avoid antitrust scrutiny,334 despite the
fact that the Antitrust IP Guidelines state pools need not necessarily be
open.335 This is not surprising when we consider that exclusionary pools
have long raised antitrust concerns.336 Non-exclusive (or 'open')
membership has historically received friendlier treatment by enforcement
agencies, as it is believed that excluding parties from a pool creates serious
anticompetitive difficulties.337
While the current Antitrust IP Guidelines state that pooling arrangements
need not necessarily be open to all firms to be pro-competitive, the ED
Guidelines of 2004 are clearly less sympathetic to the idea of exclusive
formation rules. They state that "[w]hen participation in a [...] pool creation
process is open to all interested parties representing different interests it is
Acquisition», (1993) 9 J. L. & Econ. 205 and Sang-Seung YI and Hyukseung SHIN,
«Endogenous Formation of Research Coalitions with Spillovers», (2000) 18 International
Journal ofIndustrial Organization 229.
333 See Steffen BRENNER, «Stable Patent Pools», Working Paper, Technical University of
Munich, (December I, 2004), online: <http://www.epip.ruc.dk/Papers/BRENNER_
Paper.pdf >, p. 3
334 On the MPEGA LA pool see Josh LERNER, Jean TIROLE and Marcin STROJWAS,
«Cooperative Marketing Agreements Between Competitors: Evidence from Patent Pools»,
Harvard NOM Working Paper No. 03-25, (April 26, 2003), online: <http:/ / ssm.com/abstract
=399260>, p. 30Jf.; on the 3G patent pool see Steffen BRENNER, «An Optimal Mechanism of
Patent Pool Formatioll», (March 21, 2005) [unpublished, on file with the author], p.5.
335 "Pooling arrangements generally need not be open to all who would like to join.
However, exclusion from cross-licensing and pooling arrangements among parties that
collectively possess market power may, under some circumstances, harm competition." See
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op. cit., note 125,
p.28.
336 John H. BARTON, lac. cit., note 183, 877.
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more likely that technologies for the inclusion into the pool are selected on
the basis of price/quality considerations than when the pool is set up by a
limited group of technology owners."338 Indeed, it has been suggested that it
was the pool's openness to third parties that swayed the European
Commission's toward acceptance of the 3G platform.339 Moreover, even
where a pool is open, the pool members must overcome the incentive to
remain an outside the pool.340
However, closer analysis suggests that a uniformly antagonistic stance in
regard to exclusive (or closed) patent pools is not justified, particularly since
pools with open membership are not necessarily socially superior to
exclusive pools. As Brenner pointed out, in certain cases, "[e]xclusivity of
membership helps to overcome stability problems of welfare enhancing
pools...Requiring open entry to the pool renders a pool unstable in
situations in which it may socially be beneficial."341 His analysis suggests
that competition enforcement authorities must pay closer attention to the
interplay of numerous factors in the particular case in order to determine
whether the exclusivity of membership presents competition concerns.342 In
337 See e.g., R.C. WORLEY, Jr., loco cit., note 143, 311.
338 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, «Guidelines to the Application of Article 81 of the EC
Treaty to Technology Transfer Agreements», 47 Official Journal of the European Union 2, C
101, §231, quoted in Steffen BRENNER, «An Optimal Mechanism of Patent Pool Formation»,
(March 21, 2005) [unpublished, on file with the author], p. 5.
339 See MR. FRANZINGER, loco cit., note 114, 1717. As Franzinger pointed out, I/[i]n IGR
Stereo Television, the case that appears most on point for the Platform analysis, the closed
nature of the patent pool induced the Commission's challenge. IGR demonstrates the
Commission's goal of promoting openness in patent pools.1/ Id.
340 The incentive to license independently results from a free rider problem. See Reiko AOKI
and Sadao NAGAOKA, «The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools», (2004) 55 The
Economic Review 345; Reiko AOKI, «Intellectual Property and Consortium Standard Patent
Pools», (2005) 10 Journal ofIntellectual Property Rights 206; See also, Reiko AOKI, «Clearing
Houses and Patent Pools - Access to Genetic Patents», Department ofEconomics Working Paper
No. 264, University of Auckland, online: <http:j jwww.ier.hit-u.ac.jpjpiejstage2jJapanesej
discussionpaperjdp2006j dp325jtext.pdf>.
341 S. BRENNER, loco cit., note 338, p. 44.
342 Consider, for example, Brenner's conclusion that, 1/ •••• the complete pool is supported
more easily as an equilibrium under the exclusive access rule when it comes to rather
complementary patents. In contrast, in this situation the non-exclusive pool supports the
grand coalition as an equilibrium only under strong conditions on the demand function.
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some cases, exclusionary access rules can improve economic efficiency by
improving coordination and deterring free riding.343
Moreover, as the relationship between patents becomes increasingly
complex, there is a further reason to discourage open pools. By allowing
more patents into the pool, an "open" pool policy presents a greater risk
that non-essential patents will be included and threaten competition than an
exclusionary policy. As Andewelt explained, overinclusiveness of
competing patents in pools generate more competitive problems arise than
underinclusiveness.344 As a non-exclusive pool expands, it will ultimately
accept patents that may not be essential and licensees will be required to
accept rights to unnecessary patents.345
Finally, consider that the combination of mandatory individual licensing
and open entry rules seems to induce stability problems in patent pools
which may partially explain the puzzling fact that despite the aggravating
problems associated with "patent thickets", patent pools are not observed
more frequently.346
Thus, exclusivity helps to overcome stability problems of welfare enhancing pools. On the
other side, the fragmented outcome is never be the outcome of the exclusive pool (up to iso-
profit outcomes), in particular when fragmentation would provide higher social benefits
than any pooling agreement." See S. BRENNER, loco cit., note 338, p. 43.
343 A similar point was made with respect to joint ventures. See Dennis W. CARLTON and
Steven C. SALOP, «You Keep On Knocking But You Can't Come In: Evaluating Restrictions
on Access to Input Joint Ventures», (1996) 9 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 319, 326-327. The economic
reasoning applies to pools as well. However, given the complexity involved, the authors
caution us to take care in intervening in joint ventures as there are potential efficiency
rationales before determining whether the exclusionary rules are, on balance,
anticompetitive. See Dennis W. CARLTON and Alan S. FRANKEL, «The Antitrust
Economics of Credit Card Networks: Reply to Evans and Schrnalensee Commenb>, (1995) 63
Antitrust L. J. 903, 909-910.
344 See R. ANDEWELT, loco cit., note 16, 626.
345 Carlson pointed out, " [t]he MPEG-4 protocol provides a powerful example of this
problem...If a global MPEG-4 patent portfolio is formed, such as that for MPEG-2 patents,
then licensees will be required to take title to extraneous patents. MPEG LA has advanced
three proposals for dealing with this problem, but each raises difficult pricing issues." See
S.c. CARLSON, loco cit., note 10, 391.
346 Steffen BRENNER, «An Optimal Mechanism of Patent Pool Formation», (March 21, 2005)
[unpublished, on file with the author], p. 44.
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4.4. Grantbacks, Standards and Incentives to Innovate: The
Relationship between Patent Pooling and R&D
Enforcement agencies may be stifling innovation by failing to satisfactorily
take into account the intellectual property at stake in patent pools. Their
condemnation of otherwise lawful pools may reduce incentives to innovate.
In order to understand this effect, we must first appreciate the underlying
difference between the rationale for competition law and the rationale for
intellectual property rights. Competition law has traditionally focused on
ensuring static (or allocative) efficiency. That is to say, it has adopted an ex
post perspective in examining the potential impact of agreements between
patentees on market competition and consumer surplus. On the other hand,
intellectual property rights have always been concerned with encouraging
dynamic efficiency, by creating incentives to innovate and invent.
Intellectual property law approaches from an ex ante perspective, with a
view towards spurring investment in R&D and the commercialization of
new technologies.347
Because of the difference in emphasis, it has been suggested that, " ... the
dynamic benefits from IPRs come at an allocative cost, in that the use of the
innovation will be sub-optimaL .. The dynamic-allocative efficiency trade-off
that underlies patent law applies as well to competition law, and a tension
has developed between the approaches to welfare maximization espoused
by IP and competition laws."348 Hence, the so-called the patent-antitrust
347 See F. LEVt:QUE and Y. MENIERE, op. cit., note 273, p. 85; See generally, V. DEQUIEDT
and B. VERSAEVEL, lac. cit., note 224, p. 3ff
348 M. TREBILCOCK, KA. WINTER, P. COLLINS and E.M. IACOBUCCI, op. cit., note 121, p.
574.
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paradox.349 Kaplow expressed it in the following manner: "[a] practice is
typically deemed to violate the antitrust laws because it is anticompetitive.
But the very purpose of the patent grant is to reward the patentee by
limiting competition, in full recognition that the monopolistic evils are the
price society will pay."350 Put another way: "[s]hould the protection of
consumers from the static effects of short-term price increases trump the
long-term effects of dynamic gains arising from innovation? The answers
are not straightforward and continue to be discussed and reviewed by
antitrust authorities around the world."351
However, not everyone sees a zero-sum trade-off between patent and
competition law. Instead, they view these regimes as complementary; both
designed to foster innovation and promote robust commerce and
competition.352 It has been said that, " ...both laws seek to ensure a balance
between dynamic and static efficiency, but with a different emphasis."353
Indeed, competition authorities gradually began to accept the latter view,
adopting a long, rather than short-term perspective, which recognizes that
social welfare is enhanced at least as much by technological progress (that
is, dynamic efficiency) as it is by the reduction of anticompetitive behaviour
349 "Stated on its simplest level, the patent and antitrust systems promote welfare in
different, often conflicting, ways: the patent system is based on exclusion, while antitrust
law focuses on competition. Since exclusion-based acts often restrict competition, courts are
left to reconcile two systems for promoting welfare without any compass to guide them."
Michael A. CARRIER, loco cit., note 190, 1048.
350 Louis KAPLOW, «Extension of Monopoly Power through Leverage», (1985) 85 Colum. L.
Rev. 515. For a fuller discussion of this tension see M. TREBILCOCK, R.A. WINTER, P.
COLLINS and E.M.IACOBUCCI, op. cit., note 121" p. 574ff.
351 Calvin S. GOLDMAN, Richard F. D. CORLEY and Michael E. PIAKOSKI, «Proceed with
Caution: The Application of Antitrust to Innovation-Intensive Markets», (2004) 1 Journal of
Information Law & Technology, online: <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/
jilt/2004_1/goldman/>.
352 See e.g., Atari Games Corp. V. Nintendo ofAmerica, 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir.1990).
353 F. LEVEQUE and Y. MENIERE, op. cit., note 273, p. 85.
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(that is, allocative efficiency).354 The Antitrust IP Guidelines recognize the
importance of dynamic efficiency. Referring to licensing arrangements, the
Guidelines state, "[b]y potentially increasing the expected returns from
intellectual property, licensing also can increase the incentive for its creation
and thus promote greater investment in research and development."355 In
fact, enforcement authorities' recognize that the effects of pooling on
innovation are likely to receive greater attention than in the past.356
Specifically, the antitrust agency will consider whether the patent pool
would give pool members an anticompetitive incentive to collectively
reduce investment in, or otherwise retard the pace or scope of research
efforts.357
Nevertheless, a common complaint about the enforcement agencies'
treatment of patent pools is that they still over-enforce antitrust principles,
and do not adequately take into account dynamic efficiencies. Despite the
acknowledgement of the importance of dynamic efficiency and the need to
promote innovation, it appears that static efficiency has always been the
"threshold" concern in the enforcement agencies' analysis of patent pools.358
Although the U.S. Federal Trade Commission recognized that the failure to
354 For an exposition of this view, see Harold DEMSETZ, «How Many Cheers for Antitrust's
100 Years?», (1992) 30 Journal ofEconomic Inquiry 207. See also, M. TREBILCOCK, R.A.
WINTER, P. COLLINS and E.M. IACOBUCCI, op. cit., note 121, p. 574.
355 U.s. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op. cit., note
125, p. 5.
356 See Joel 1. KLEIN, «Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law», (Address before the American
Intellectual Property Law Association, May 2, 1997), online: <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
pubIic/speeches/1118.pdf>, p. 8.
357 See D. LIN, loco cit., note 86, 306. He cites the example of the MPEG-2 patent pool, where
the DOJ did not discourage pool members from developing or supporting rival standards.
See Letter from Joel Klein, Assistant Attorney General, to Carey R. Ramos, Esq., Sullivan &
Cromwell Oune 26, 1997), online: <http://www.usdoj.gov/ atr/ pubIic/busreview/2485
htrn>, p. 12.
See also, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of
Competition and Patent Law and Policy, (Oct. 2003), online: <http://www.ftc.gov/ opa/2003/
10cpreport.htrn>, p. 4.
358 See J.A. NEWBERG, loco cit., note 9, 2.
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strike the proper balance can harm innovation,359 the tension between
patent and competition law seems, for the most part, to be resolved in
favour of the latter.
This disparity in favour of static or allocative efficiency is not without
consequence. Consider that, "[a]n antitrust policy that reduced prices by 5
percent today at the expense of reducing by 1 percent the annual rate at
which innovation lowers the costs of production would be a calamity. In the
long run a continuous rate of change, compounded, swamps static
losses."36o As a result, there is reasonable concern about enforcement
agencies' failure to strike the appropriate balance.
Specifically, there is concern that enforcement agencies pay insufficient
attention to the grantback provisions in pooling arrangements that may
stifle innovation. A grantback clause is a clause by which the licensee
"grants back" to the licensor either outright ownership or a license in
respect of any improvements to the intellectual property that is the subject
of their licensing agreement.361
Grantbacks are not without their redeeming qualities. Although in the
1970's, enforcement agencies' routinely viewed grantbacks as illegal, they
have come to recognize certain possible procompetitive effects, such as the
fact that grantbacks might actually encourage patent owners to license their
patents in the first place, thereby enabling the licensees' improvements.
Indeed, grantbacks are procompetitive insofar as they allow parties to share
359 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of
Competition and Patent Law and Policy, (Oct. 2003), online: <http://www.ftc.gov/ opa/2003/
10cpreport.htm>, p. 3.
360 Frank H. EASTERBROOK, «Ignorance and Antitrust», in Thomas M. JORDE and David J.
TEECE (eds.), Antitrust, Innovation, and Competitiveness, New York, Oxford University
Press, 1992, p. 119 at page 122-123.
361 See e.g., A.J. WEINSCHEL, op. cit., note 204, p. 290.
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the risks and rewards associated with innovation.362 The European
Commission Guidelines state that" ... [i]t is legitimate for the parties to
ensure that the exploitation of the pooled technology cannot be held up by
licensees that hold or obtain essential patents."363 On the other hand, a
grantback provision, particularly one that deprives the grantor of the right
to use the improved technology, is considered to be a significant
disincentive for a licensee to engage in further costly research and
development.364 The Antitrust IP Guidelines state this clearly:
"[A] pooling arrangement that requires members to grant licenses to each
other for current and future technology at minimal cost may reduce the
incentives of its members to engage in research and development because
members of the pool have to share their successful research and development
and each of the members can free ride on the accomplishments of other pool
members."365
The DOl's business review letters examined the grant-back clauses
proposed in the DVD and MPEG pooling agreements and concluded that
the three pools were procompetitive and did not reduce incentives to
innovate.366 For example, with the MPEG pool, it found that the grantback
provisions were limited to "essential" patents and required only a non-
exclusive cross-license on reasonable, non-discriminating terms, thus
limiting the ability of a patentee to extract a supracompetitive royalty from
362 See L.A.W. HUNTER and D.J. BROWN, lac. cit., note 128, p.19.
363 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, «Guidelines to the Application of Article 81 of the EC
Treaty to Technology Transfer Agreements», 47 Official Journal of the European Union 2, C
101, §228.
364 This concern was expressed by Yee Wah CHIN and Kathryn E. WALSH, «Antitrust
Pitfalls in Licensing», in David BENDER (ed.), Intellectual Property Antitrust 2006, New York,
Practising Law Institute, 2006, p. 221at page 371. See also D.G. RAYMOND, lac. cit., note 85,
42. We may reasonably believe that the Canadian Competition Bureau will examine
grantback clauses in a similar manner in order to determine whether they are likely to have
a pro-competitive or anticompetitive effect. See L.A.W. HUNTER and D.J. BROWN, lac. cit.,
note 128, p. 19.
365 U.s. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op. cit., note
125, p. 28.
366 See e.g., Letter from Joel Klein, Assistant Attorney General, to Carey R. Ramos, Esq.,
Sullivan & Cromwell Gune 26, 1997), online: <http:! jwww.usdoj.govjatrjpublicj
busreviewj2485.pdf>, p. 8-9.
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that patent. 367 By requiring non-discriminatory grantback licenses, the
threat that the licensing fee would be manipulated to the disadvantage of
their downstream competitors would be lessened.368 Thus, the grantback
provisions were deemed to be sufficiently narrow so that they did not also
threaten incentives to innovate.369
However, it has been suggested that when pooling occurs with
standardized technology within a network industry, lithe innovation
analysis under the IP Guidelines does not seem to go far enough."370
Essentially, once a standard is adopted in a network industry, excess inertia
impedes a collective shift from a common standard or technology to a
possibly superior new standard or technology. Not only is there difficulty in
coordinating any changes, but often parties are heavily invested or tied to a
particular standard and are thus resistant to change. The need to adhere to a
standard imposes limits on product design, which can lead to dynamic
losses as firms are foreclosed from certain paths of R&D that could result in
innovative new products.371As a result, the benefits of compatibility often
prevail over the benefits of a new standard.372 Consequently, " .. ...although
patent pooling arrangements may lead to more efficient development of
standardized software, they will also likely lead to a further retardation of
research and invention in the standards market by increasing the incentive to
create standards-compliant software."373
367 See D.G. RAYMOND, lac. cit., note 85, 44.
368 See P.H. SAINT-ANTOINE, lac. cit., note 213, 8.
369 See RC. WORLEY, Jr., lac. cit., note 143, 300-301.
370 D. LIN, lac. cit., note 86, 306.
371 See C. SHAPIRO, op. cit., note 76, p. 88.
372 See Joseph FARRELL, «Standardization and Intellectual Property», (1989) 30 Jurimetrics
Journal 35, 37. See also Joseph FARRELL and Garth SALONER, «Standardization,
Compatibility, and Innovation», (1985) 16 Rand Journal ofEconomics 70, 72.
373 D. LIN, lac. cit., note 86, 297.
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The DOl's analysis of the MPEG-2 patent pool- while demonstrating a more
nuanced approach reflecting a more modern approach to grantback clauses,
- offered no discussion of the issue of the positional strength of an accepted
standard.374 It is entirely possible that under the enforcement authorities
approval, "[i]nnovations in digital video compression may still emerge;
however, they will more likely be skewed towards backward-compatible
(but potentially cumbersome) technologies developed and driven by
continued collaboration among pool members and buoyed by their desire to
maintain the standard in the indUStry."375 As a standard becomes more
important and entrenched, the risk of abuse increases. 376 Consequently,
antitrust authorities must pay more attention to the effects of patent pooling
on innovation as a number of the pooling arrangements that were
sanctioned by enforcement authorities have concerned industry standards.
374 According to Tom and Newberg, modern antitrust analysis of grantbacks has been
influenced by recent scholarship on the economics of incremental or sequential innovation.
Essentially, articles by Barton, Green and Scotchmer, as well as, Chang, Merges and Nelson
suggest that the optimal division of returns among initial and follow-on innovators is
neither self-evident nor necessarily the same in all circumstances. Whether a grantback
should be considered legal is a question that must be determined through economic
analysis. Consequently, the rigid approach espoused in the Nine No-No's (that asserts
without evidence that exclusive grantback provisions stifle follow-on innovation) cannot be
justified. See W.K. TOM and J.A. NEWBERG, loco cit., note 211, 183, fn 87. See also, John H.
BARTON, «Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and Sequential
Innovation», (1997) 65 Antitrust L.J. 449; Jerry R. GREEN and Suzanne SCOTCHMER, «On
the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation», (1995) 26 Rand Journal ofEconomics 20;
Howard F. CHANG, «Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation», (1995) 26
Rand Journal ofEconomics 34; Robert P. MERGES and Richard R. NELSON, «Market
Structure and Technical Advance: The Role of Patent Scope Decisions», in Thomas M.
JORDE and David J. TEECE (eds.), Antitrust, Innovation, and Competitiveness, New York,
Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 82.
375 D. LIN, loco cit., note 86, 308-309. Thus, while pools may reduce innovation generally,
innovation within the incumbent standard may still benefit from pooling arrangements. As
noted earlier, pooling arrangements enable pool members to combine resources and
technologies for further research. However, such research seems inevitably skewed towards
retaining the incumbent standard and may lead to future technologies that are constrained
by concerns for backwards compatibility with the incumbent standard. See Michael KATZ
and Carl SHAPIRO, «Systems Competition and Network Effects», (1994) 8 Journal of
Economic Perspectives 93, 95 (" Although compatibility has obvious benefits, obtaining and
maintaining compatibility often involves a sacrifice in terms of product variety or restraints
on innovation.").
376 See M. WAKUl, op. cit., note 15, p. 83.
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Indeed, even in the absence of patent pooling, retardation of innovation in
standardized industries is a well-recognized phenomenon. However, the
literature that suggests standardization can retard innovation "is premised
on the assumption that there has already been enough incentive for
competitors to develop alternative choices to the current standard. The
effects of patent pooling may weaken this assumption."377 What this means
is that pooling makes it less expensive for firms to participate in the
standard. The possibility of acquiring a package licenses from the pool
permits firms to develop products compatible with the incumbent standard
that would otherwise find it prohibitively expensive to do so. Had pooling
not made compatibility with the standard less costly, firms would be driven
to redirect their resources towards developing new patents and
technologies that could 'leapfrog' over the incumbent standard. Patent
pools, therefore, can have the effect of reducing innovation, as potential
inventors shift their resources towards developing standardized products
rather than investing in researching possible leapfrogging technologies to
replace the standard.378
We see then that where the pooling involves a standard in a network
industry, the competition analysis must be incredibly nuanced in each
particular case to determine whether in fact the pool should be proscribed.
A purely ex post analysis, which is typical of competition law, may overlook
377 D. LIN, loco cit., note 86, 306.
378 Interestingly, this reasoning supports the idea that anything less than a complete refusal to
license should not be tolerated. This is a concern because a monopolist (and by extension,
members of a patent pool) frequently has more to gain by licensing with restrictions than by
refusing to license altogether. For example, a refusal may actually generate more incentive
in others to invent around or "leapfrog" the monopolist's position than a license with
restrictions. Conversely, licensing just enough and with sufficient restrictions to stymie
innovation may be more effective in protecting and extending a monopoly than refusal, and
thus more detrimental to the public interest. See Dana W. HAYTER, «When a License is
Worse than a Refusal: A Comparative Competitive Effects Standard to Judge Restrictions in
Intellectual Property Licenses», (1996) 11 Berkeley Tech. L.]. 281,282.
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the effect of antitrust policy on the incentive to innovate and overstate the
case for prohibiting patent pools.379
v. Conclusion
As we have seen from the discussion of the essentiality doctrine, pool
exclusivity, independent licensing and grantback clauses, the issues raised
by patent pools and their regulation are not easily managed. Modern pools
are structurally complex, with multifaceted relationships between the
various patent owners, and between those owners and licensees, generating
a host of potential procompetitive and anticompetitive effects. This is
further complicated by "pervasive uncertainty" surrounding any new
technology and its impact on dynamic markets.38o
In response to these modern pools, antitrust rules have evolved. Modern
competition enforcement agencies attempt a balancing of pro- and
anticompetitive consequences. There is a recognition that "[c]ompetition
and patent policy are bound together by the economics of innovation and an
intricate web of legal rules that seek to balance the scope and effect of each
policy." 381 Enforcement authorities have attempted to further tailor
competition rules and policy in order to facilitate development without
compromising competition. As part of this process, they have adopted a
number of screening mechanisms to ensure pools do not incorporate
unnecessary patents and have articulated 'safe harbours', by which firms
might avoid antitrust scrutiny. The idea that these authorities ought to
fashion safe harbours to allow firms to contract in a manner consistent with
379 See Vincenzo DENICOLO, «Competing Innovations and Antitrust Policy: Reflections on
the Summit/VISX Case», in Mario BALDASSARRI and Luca LAMBERTINI (eds.), Antitrust,
Regulation and Competition, New York, PaIgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 249 at page 262.
380 See R. SKITOL and 1. WU, op. cit., note 12, p. 107.
381 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of
Competition and Patent Law and Policy, (Oct. 2003), online: <http://www.ftc.govI opal
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the demands competition law is a popular view, and is championed by,
among others, Garrard R. Beeney, (who represented patent holders in the
formation of the MPEG-2, MPEG-4, DVD, and IEEE 1394 patent pools).382
Beeney offered nine procompetitive characteristics, which he called the
"nine yes-yesses" that could constitute a safe harbor for patent pools.383
While the appeal to 'safe harbours' would reduce the uncertainty that
discourages socially beneficial pool formation and generate efficiencies in
enforcement, we must remain cognizant of the challenges that exist in
creating safe harbours and be wary of the 'precedential' effect of the
business review letters that incorporate screening mechanisms such as the
essentiality doctrine. As we have seen above, while USPTO research patent
pool is basically indistinguishable from the pools that received DOJ/FTC
approval, "[t]he inability to identify and limit the research tool pool's
composition to essential patents precludes the pool from finding a safe
harbor among the approved, procompetitive pools."384 The highly fact-
specific nature of each pool and their particularities make the formulation of
'safe harbours' to facilitate pool formation difficult. For example, in a
biotechnology patent pool, these parties are likely to be diverse parties with
differing agendas, which would greatly influence the ability of the parties to
reach an agreement.385 Moreover in fields such as biotechnology, initiatives
such as the 'Golden rice' and SARS pools, do not form around precisely
2003j10cpreport.htm>, p. 2.
382 See Garrard R. BEENEY, «Uncertainty and the Disincentive to Create Efficiencies: The
Need for a Safe Harbor for Patent Pools», in Paul LUGARD and Leigh HANCHER (eds.),
On the Merits: Current Issues in Competition Law and Policy, (liber amicorum Peter Plompen),
Antwerp, Intersentia, 2005, p. 201. See also, Garrard R. BEENEY, «Pro-Competitive Aspects
of Intellectual Property Pools: A Proposal for Safe Harbor Provisions», (Submission to the
United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission
Joint Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-
Based Economy, April 17, 2002), online: <http:j jwww.ftc.govjoppjintellectj020417
Garrardrbeeney.pdf>.
383 Garrard R. BEENEY, "«Pro-Competitive Aspects of Intellectual Property Pools»" Id.
384 S. IYAMA, loco cit., note 289, 1240.
385 See AX RAI, loco cit., note 288, 840-841.
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defined technical standards, which can hamper pool formation. 386 Likewise,
the essential patents criterion masks a remarkably complex inquiry, whose
sheer complexity may be its undoing.387 Patent pools in biotechnology are
therefore not as promising as in other industries.388 These types of issues
have led some authors to question whether current competition law and
enforcement is capable of dealing with the complexities inherent in
industries characterized by rapid innovation.389 These authors have pointed
out that,
IIAntitrust authorities are finding themselves faced with the challenges posed
by markets that refuse to stand still and shun the traditional trappings of
competition law that use a 'snapshot' of product and geographic markets,
market shares, monopolies and barriers to entry. As the products and
services of the information economy become increasingly complex and
change occurs almost daily with successive innovations, antitrust authorities
are (and will continue to be) faced with questions that many of their
traditional understandings of markets and methods of analysis and
enforcement. II 390
If competition enforcement is to be successful in limiting the anticompetitive
risks of pools while encouraging innovation, it must demonstrate an
386 Reiko AOKI and Aaron SCHIFF, «Promoting Access to Intellectual Property: Patent
Pools, Copyright Collectives and Clearinghouses», (April 6, 2007), online: <http://ssm.
comlabstract=976852>, p. 8.
See also, Birgit VERBEURE, Esther VAN ZIMMEREN, Gert MATTHIJS and Gert VAN
OVERWALLE, «Patent Pools and Diagnostic Testing», (2006) 24 Trends in Biotechnology 115,
for a summary of these pools and a discussion of issues relating to the formation of patent
pools in medical diagnostic testing.
387 See M.D. JANIS, loco cit., note 245, p. 35.
388 Sandra SCHMIEDER, «Scope of Biotechnology Inventions in the United States and in
Europe - Compulsory Licensing, Experimental Use and Arbitration: A Study of
Patentability of DNA-Related Inventions with Special Emphasis on the Establishment of an
Arbitration Based Compulsory Licensing System», (2004) 21 Santa Clara Compo & High Tech.
L. J. 163, 224-226. See David B. RESNIK, «A Biotechnology Patent Pool: An Idea Whose Time
Has Come?», (2003) 3 Journal ofPhilosophy, Science & Law Ganuary 2003} online: <http:/I
www6.rniarni.edu/ethics/jpsljarchives/papers/biotechPatent.htmI> for a discussion of the
strengths and weaknesses of pools in the biotechnology sector.
389 Daniel L. RUBINFLED and John HOVEN, «Innovation and Antitrust Enforcement», in
Jerry ELLIG (ed.), Dynamic Competition and Public Policy: Technology, Innovation and Antitrust
Issues, New York,
Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 65 at page 65.
390 C.S. GOLDMAN, RF.D. CORLEY and M.E. PIAKOSKI, loco cit., note 351.
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awareness of the dynamic nature of the particular market and show
sensitivity to the particular context in which the pooling is taking place.391 In
effect,
"Competition policy and antitrust analysis must begin to think differently
about certain "monopoly" issues. The nature of competition in markets
exposed to the effects of rapid technological innovation is quite different
from competition in other markets. Market power is extremely difficult to
calibrate, and the traditional models of competition - be they perfect
competition, oligopoly or monopoly - have limited utility. Accordingly,
economists and antitrust lawyers must rethink some basic assumptions and
recalibrate some metrics or risk promoting litigation outcomes and public
policies that harm competition and consumers."392
The point here is not to question whether antitrust enforcement is necessary
or usefu}393 in the context of patent pools. Rather, what I suggest is that
enforcement agencies may have to revisit and rethink fundamental
principles, such as the idea that intellectual and tangible property can be
treated in essentially the same manner.394 Only through careful analysis of
the facts can the appropriate outcome be achieved.395 They must recognize
that, O[t]he relatively wooden one-size-fits-all set of rules emanating from
the antitrust enforcement agencies to date are insufficiently flexible in some
391 See R. SKITOL and L. WU, op. cit., note 12, p. 116. See also R. BEKKER, E. IVERSEN and
K. BLIND, loc cit., note 106,45.
392 Christopher PLEATSIKAS and David TEECE, «New Indicia for Antitrust Analysis in
Markets Experiencing Rapid Innovatioll», in Jerry ELLIG (ed.), Dynamic Competition and
Public Policy: Technology, Innovation and Antitrust Issues, New York, Cambridge University
Press, 2001, p. 95, at page 95.
393 For an example of such argumentation see, Jonathan B. BAKER, «The Case for Antitrust
Enforcemenb>, (2003) 17 Journal ofEconomic Perspectives 27.
394 See Richard J. GILBERT and Willard K. TOM, «Is Innovation King at the Antitrust
Agencies? The Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later», (2001) 69 Antitrust L. J. 43,
47, highlighting at least three aspects in which intellectual property differs from tangible
property. Others have pointed out that the misconception about the equivalence of
intellectual and tangible property is the key problem in analyzing the tension between IPRs
and antitrust. See e.g., James LANGENFELD, «Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Steps
Toward Striking a Balance», (2001) 52 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 91.
395 There is, however, evidence of a further evolution in the approach of enforcement
authorities. A new DOJ and FTC report was released in April 2007. See U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE and FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual
Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition, (2007), online: <www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf>.
92
respects and insufficiently attentive to competitive risks in other respects.
Policymakers must deepen their understanding of how pools affect
competitive conditions in affected markets as they evolve, fashioning rules
for them that maximize risks with due regard for how different pools may
affect competition within different markets over different stages of their
operation."396
Yet, as Douglas Melamed reminds us, "[t]he problem, however, is that
neither economic actors nor law enforcement entities are omniscient. Given
real world limitations, market-wide balancing tests that seek to assess the
benefits and competitive harms of exclusionary conduct are intractable for
courts and antitrust agencies, and even more so for firms trying to decide in
real time what conduct is permitted and what is prohibited."397
The desire for theoretical precision must give way to practical enforcement
considerations, in light of the myriad ways in which technological,
structural and regulatory realities impact competition.398 Enforcement
agencies must be prepared to accept pools that don't prima facie meet the
criteria set out in the business review letters or established 'safe harbours'.
Business review letters may offer useful guiding principles, " '" however, as
the competition effect may be significantly varied and economic analysis
has a limitation, so that efficacy of the regulation may depend on a case-by-
case reasoning process."399 As a result, it is not necessarily the case that a
patent pool would violate the antitrust laws if it failed to implement each
and every one of the safeguards adopted by the parties requesting the
business review letter. 400 Enforcement agencies must also consider
differences between industries and the impact they have on their patent
396 R. SKITOL and 1. WU, op. cit., note 12, p. 116.
397 A.D. MELAMED, lac. cit., note 313, 1254.
398 See W.J. BAER and D.A. BALTO, lac. cit., note 82, 74.
399 M. WAKUI, op. cit., note 15, p. 104.
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licensing strategy and the formation of pools. Studies have shown that" ....
there are substantial differences in the ways in which different industries
use patents. Survey evidence suggests that some industries like chemicals
and petroleum are similar to research medicines in their use of patents, and
others like electronics and communications equipment are similar to
t "401compu ers ....
On the other hand, parties must not blindly adopt pool characteristics
simply because they have been treated favourably by competition
authorities in the past. They must evaluate their pools in light of the
economic evidence and determine which elements are truly necessary for
their pool, and be prepared to make the arguments necessary to justify
deviations from recognized practices where they can be supported by sound
economic and competition law analysis.
At the end of the day, parties must be prepared to fashion their own pooling
arrangement in light of their specific circumstances and enforcement
authorities must be willing to examine each submission on its own merits,
not according to past decisions. They must be prepared to overcome their
reluctance to form pools in an uncertain regulatory environment and defend
the pools they create from attack by competition authorities. If they are
prepared to do this, we may see a return to the prominence of pools in the
the 21st century.402
400 See M. DELRAHIM, lac. cit., note 126, 7-8.
401 Deepak SOMAYA «Strategic Determinants of Decisions Not to Settle Patent Litigation»,
(2003) 24 Strategic Management ]ournal17, 36
402 See J. LERNER and J. TIROLE, lac. cit., note 116, 691.
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